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ABSTRACT 
ELECTIONS MATTER: THE POLITICS OF PROSECUTING DECEPTIVE 
ADVERTISING IN WISCONSIN 
by 
Courtney Vander Veen Mich 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2016 
Under the Supervision of Professor David Pritchard 
This study examines the causal relationship between ideology and regulation. Specifically, 
this study looks at the relationship between Wisconsin elected officials and their political party in 
relation to the level of enforcement of the Wisconsin deceptive advertising statute. The study 
analyzed 79 Wisconsin cases prosecuted for deceptive advertising from 2003 through 2014. The 
79 cases occurred over the span of three different governor and attorney general four-year periods. 
These cases were analyzed for outcomes and the number of cases prosecuted during each of the 
three four-year periods present in Wisconsin. Fifty-six of the 79 cases were analyzed further for 
the number of defendants, type of defendants, amount of forfeitures ordered by the court during 
each four-year period. The study found that the part of the governor and attorney general 
correlated with the number of deceptive advertising cases prosecuted and the amount of 
forfeiture ordered in a four-year period. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Advertisers and lawmakers have long been concerned with the potential of deceiving 
people about products and services through advertising. Laws against deceptive advertising have 
been in place at the state level for over 100 years.1 Wisconsin was one of the first American states 
to enact legislation against deceptive advertising.2 By the end of the twentieth century, all 50 
states had enacted legislation against deceptive advertising, similar to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act.3 Commercial speech can be regulated at the state level, and is in the state of 
Wisconsin. However, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), is the primary regulatory body of 
commercial speech.4 
Over the past century, Wisconsin’s law regarding deceptive advertising hasn’t changed 
much, save expanding the law to cover radio and television.5 Regulation of deceptive advertising 
is a form of consumer protection, which is presumably important to a market economy. 
Wisconsin has departments devoted to consumer protection issues in the Department of 
Agriculture, Trade and the Consumer Protection and in the Wisconsin Department of Justice.  
                                               
1 DANIEL POPE, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING 206 (1983). 
2 Laws of Wisconsin Chapter 510, (1913), 576–77 (1913); POPE, supra note 1 at 206. Ohio was the first U.S. state 
to enact a deceptive advertising law on February 26, 1913. Wisconsin’s law took effect on June 21, 1913. 
3 15 U.S.C. §§41-58; KENNETH PLEVAN & MIRIAM SIROKEY, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE HANDBOOK 289 
(2nd ed. 1988); COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW: 2014 EDITION, 168 (W. Wat Hopkins ed., 2014). The Federal 
Trade Commission oversees national advertising campaigns for deceptive, fraudulent, or misleading advertising 
claims. Unlike many state deceptive advertising laws, federal law does not allow for private lawsuits. Federal and 
state laws regulate commercial speech, but federal law always supersedes state law in the event of conflict between 
the two. 
4 COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW: 2014 EDITION, supra note 3 at 164. 
5 Kathleen Kepner, State Regulation of Advertising,  in THE WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 183, 186 (1956); WIS. STAT. 
TIT. 100, 100.18 (2014). The original language of 1913 statute covered only public statements or announcements in 
print form. Eventually the language of the statute was changed to include advertisements over “any radio or 
television station, or in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement, announcement, 
statement or representation of any kind to the public.” The law has yet to be updated to include explicit language 
covering cable and internet. 
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Political party lines have the potential to affect the enforcement of the law. How the law 
is applied determines the level of protection for the people and businesses of Wisconsin.  In 
Wisconsin, the attorney general’s office prosecutes individuals or business responsible for 
deceptive advertising under the Wisconsin Fraudulent Representations law.6 The party of the 
elected governor and attorney general, Democratic or Republican, may determine the level of 
government regulation of the economy, where term is defined as the combination of governor 
and attorney general. This study hypothesizes a relationship between political party and 
application of Wisconsin’s Fraudulent Representations law.  
 My theory is that ideology is related to regulation. Ideology is a system of shared beliefs 
and ideas that influences and forms political power structures.7 Regulation is defined as state 
made laws or tools that are used to standardize conduct and to manage social, economic, and 
ecological risks.8 In this study, ideology is operationalized and measured by the political party of 
the elected officials. Regulation is operationalized and measured by the level of enforcement of 
Wisconsin Statute 100.18. My general hypothesis is that the political party of the elected 
official(s) has an impact on the level of regulation of deceptive advertising with stricter regulation 
during a Democratic term than during a non-Democratic term. 
 In theory, consumer protection laws protect people against abusive business practices. 
These laws are in place at federal and state level, holding sellers of goods and services accountable 
for any deceptive information disseminated to the public. In Wisconsin, the Department of 
                                               
6 WIS. STAT. TIT. 100, supra note 5. 
7 TERRY EAGLETON, LITERARY THEORY 13 (2nd ed. 1996). My definition was derived from Eagleton’s definition 
of ideology.  
8 David Levi-Faur, Regulation & Regulatory Governance, Working Paper No. 1 JERUS. PAP. REGUL. GOV. 1–47, 4 
(2010). 
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Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection and the attorney general’s office enforce consumer 
protection laws, including laws against deceptive advertising. Voters believe consumer protection 
to be an important issue.9 Given that the attorney general is elected and that the secretary of the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection is appointed by the governor, it 
stands to reason that political ideology could have some influence over the application of 
consumer protection laws, specifically deceptive advertising. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the 
conceptual framework of my hypotheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
9 Colin Provost, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney General Participation in Multi-State 
Lawsuits, 59 POLIT. RES. Q. 609–18, 612 (2006). 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual framework 
 
 
In the following pages of this study, I will attempt to explore the inner workings of 
Wisconsin’s consumer protection process and the roles elected officials play in this process. 
Chapter 2 explores political ideology, the history of Wisconsin’s fraudulent representations law 
underpinning the importance of this study to government workers and citizens alike, and 
identifies the specific hypotheses. In Chapter 3 I outline the methodology used in this study, 
how I tracked down, acquired and analyzed the data. In Chapter 4 I discuss in detail the study’s 
5 
findings in relation to my specific hypotheses as well as address other interesting results found in 
the data. Chapter 5 discusses what the findings mean and the importance of them. Chapter 6 
restates the key findings of this study, acknowledges the limitations of this study and points to 
future research opportunities. 
Figure 2 
Conceptual breakdown 
Level of enforcement 
of §100.18 
Number of complaints 
filed in circuit court 
Average payment per 
case 
Average payment per 
defendant 
Number of defendants 
in a 4-year term 
Guilty Not guilty Dismissed Settlement
Jail Fines 
Free to 
go 
Fines, no 
admission 
of guilt 
Free to 
go 
Free to 
go 
Fines 
Restitution Fines Fines Restitution Business/ 
organization 
Individual 
6
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 
I. Political Theory 
 
 Generally when Americans speak about American politics, two political parties are 
recognized, Republicans and Democrats. Republican Party and Democratic Party are essentially 
the brand names for the groups of individuals and their ideals, and unlike special interest groups, 
political parties “do not have ‘natural’ issues positions.”10 The Republican and Democratic parties 
are not the only political parties in America, but due to the financial backing of these two parties 
via large corporations and wealthy individuals, the majority of political power lies with these two 
parties. At the most basic level, the Republican Party claims to favor state rights and smaller 
federal government, while the Democrats often support expanding social welfare programs and 
policies.11 Each political party holds a “set of interrelated attitudes that fit together into [a] 
coherent and consistent view of or orientation towards the political world,” otherwise known as 
political ideology.12 In American politics, liberalism and conservatism are the most recognized 
political ideologies.13 Because of the ideological differences between the two parties, each party 
believes economic and consumer issues should be handled differently. Both Republicans and 
Democrats have distinct sets of ideas that shape how the party and its elected officials shape their 
economic policies. 
                                               
10 James M. Snyder, Jr. & Michael M. Ting, An Informational Rationale for Political Parties, 46 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 
90–110, 90–91 (2002). 
11 TIMOTHY O. LENZ & MIRYA HOLMAN, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 187 (2013); Republican National 
Committee, GOP REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, https://www.gop.com/the-2016-republican-party-platform/; 
Democrats, THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM DEMOCRATS, https://www.democrats.org/party-platform. 
12 WILLIAM H. FLANIGAN ET AL., POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE 179 (13 ed. 2015). 
13 Id. at 146. 
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 Both the Republican and Democratic parties project clear political ideologies, and while 
American voters hold “opinions on a wide range of issues” these opinions are labeled either 
liberal leaning or conservative leaning by political commentators and analysts.14 In modern day 
American politics, the Democratic Party typically represents liberal leaning political ideologies. 
On the other hand, the Republican Party represents the more conservative leaning political 
ideologies.15 Most Americas are able to articulate their political ideological leanings in terms of 
liberal and conservative, but the Democratic and Republican parties do not always fully represent 
liberal and conservative leanings.16  
 More Americans indicate that they believe themselves to have more “middle-of-the-
road” ideologies or “haven’t thought about it” in comparison to liberal or conservative ideological 
identification.17 Business autonomy tends to be an issue that many Americans have opinions on, 
as do the Democratic and Republican parties. Because the country has supported a two party 
system for over 150 years, many voters are able to identify as Republican or Democratic and 
many elected officials adhere to either the Republican or Democratic party values.18 Identifying 
with a political party tends to hinge on social issues as well as feeling a sense of “closeness to the 
social groups affiliated with the parties.”19 And though voters can identify with one party or the 
other on a sliding scale, the following assessments of the two major American political parties are 
                                               
14 Id. at 179–180. 
15 Id. at 180–182. 
16 Id. at 179. 
17 Id. at 181. 
18 Id. at 99. 
19 Paul Goren, Party Identification and Core Political Values, 49 AM. J. POLIT. SCI. 881–896, 881 (2005). 
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a general outline of party beliefs, common practices, and visions of citizenship and independent 
citizen actions.20  
A.  Republicans 
 
 
 In general, citizens who feel close to social groups typically affiliated with the Republican 
Party, such as business people, white evangelical Protestants, white men with some college or 
less, and culturally conservative individuals identify themselves as part of the Republican Party.21 
Republicans tend to believe that the government’s role is to uphold U.S. citizens’ ability to secure 
the freedoms of a democratic society for themselves; individuals are responsible for their own 
“autonomy or rights.”22 The Republican Party’s core beliefs stress the importance of the 
individual and thus decreasing state involvement in the economy, increasing individual liberties, 
and restricting the power of unions.23  
 The economic theory that the Republicans claim to favor is a laissez-faire or free market 
theory in terms of business autonomy.24 This theory proposes that businesses should face little 
regulation from the government, consumers and competing business should take on the role of 
regulating unfair business practices. Another key objective of the Republican Party is a minimal 
state.25 The free market theory suggests that sellers of superior products will regulate the market 
by informing consumers of the inferior products and false claims of the inferior products through 
                                               
20 FLANIGAN ET AL., supra note 12 at 101–102. 
21 Goren, supra note 19 at 882; RUSSELL J. DALTON, CITIZEN POLITICS: PUBLIC OPINION AND POLITICAL 
PARTIES IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL DEMOCRACIES 145 (6th ed. 2014); Strong Groups for the Democratic and 
Republican Parties, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-
party-affiliation/4-6-2015_lede/. 
22 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 202 (3rd ed. 2006). 
23 Id. at 201. 
24 Robert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. LAW REV. 661–
701, 663 (1977); HELD, supra note 22 at 201. 
25 HELD, supra note 22 at 201. 
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advertising.26 Consumers are expected to protect their own consumer interest by initiating 
consumer suits against deceptive advertisers.27 Placing consumer protection on consumers and or 
“sellers with superior products” remedies the need for government intervention.28 The free 
market theory upholds the idea that the market will regulate itself, thus leaving the regulation of 
the market to businesses rather than government. Republicans tend to lend a higher amount of 
business autonomy than does the Democratic Party, thus trusting the economy to right itself 
with little to no government involvement. 
 A Gallup poll surveying politically motivated U.S. citizens illustrates partisan trust in the 
U.S. government and U.S. businesses to solve economic problems. The poll shows that 64 
percent of Republicans trust businesses to solve economic problems compared to 29 percent of 
Republicans trusting the U.S. government to solve the U.S.’s economic problems.29 In contrast, 
72 percent of Democrats trust the U.S. government to solve the U.S.’s economic problems 
compared to 24 percent of Democrats trusting U.S. business (See Table 1).30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
26 Pitofsky, supra note 24 at 663. 
27 Id. at 667. 
28 Id. at 667. 
29 Frank Newport, ON ECONOMY, REPUBLICANS TRUST BUSINESS; DEMS TRUST GOV’T GALLUP (2009), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/116599/Economy-Republicans-Trust-Business-Dems-Trust-Gov.aspx; MARK D. 
BREWER & JEFFREY M. STONECASH, POLARIZATION OF THE POLITICS OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY 95 
(2015). 
30 Newport, supra note 29. 
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54% 
29% 
49% 
72% 
42% 
64% 
47% 
24% 
0% 
10% 
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U.S. Government 
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Table 1 
Who do you trust more to solve the United States’ economic problems-the U.S. government or U.S. 
businesses? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gallup Poll, March 5-8, 2009 
Based on 500 national adults in survey form B31 
 
 
Due to the party’s belief that the government is doing too much to regulate the nation’s 
economy, GOP politicians would be less likely to intervene with deceptive advertising and rather 
let the market or competitors correct the deceptive messages.32 Republican elected politicians are 
less likely to regulate business because their ideological beliefs lean towards letting the market 
                                               
31 Id.  “Results are based on telephone interviews with 1,012 national adults, aged 18 and older, conducted March 5-
8, 2009. For results based on the total sample of national adults, one can say with 95% confidence that the 
maximum margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points. For results based on the 500 national adults in the 
Form B half-sample, the maximum margins of sampling error are ±5 percentage points. For results based on the 512 
national adults in the Form A half-sample and 500 national adults in the Form B half-sample, the maximum 
margins of sampling error are ±5 percentage points."  
This is the most current Gallup Poll available concerning America’s trust and economic problem solving. 
32 Id. 
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handle itself.33 I am not implying that Republicans avoid regulation entirely but rather place a 
greater importance on the responsibility of individuals and marketplace competitors to solve 
marketplace problems.34  
B.  Democrats 
 
 
 The social groups that tend to feel closer the Democratic Party are non-white Americans, 
Millennials, Jews, post-graduate women, and the religiously unaffiliated.35 The Democratic Party 
believes the government’s role in society is to intervene and regulate the economy when in the 
public’s interest, but to refrain from intervening in the private affairs of individuals.36 Those who 
subscribe to a more liberal political ideology aim to foster a “relationship between state, civil 
society and subject populations.”37 Instead of fostering a society where individuals are responsible 
for advocating for their own “autonomy or rights,” Democrats believe the government should 
further a society that actively supports groups of people.38 The poor, the elderly, the unemployed 
are among the groups of people the Democratic Party believes are not always able to fully obtain 
the benefits of a democratic society and thus should be helped by their government.39 
 The Democratic Party puts a higher value on society as a whole, sometimes at the cost of 
individual freedoms, and aims to balance majority and minority needs. Rather than a free market 
economy, Democrats favor a fair market economy, on the theory that capitalism works best when 
                                               
33 Colin Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33 
PUBLIUS 37–53, 46 (2003). 
34 Id. at 46.; Pitofsky, supra note 24 at 663. 
35 Strong Groups for the Democratic and Republican Parties, supra note 21. 
36 Democratic Party, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA.COM (2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-
Party. 
37 HELD, supra note 22 at 209. 
38 Democratic Party, supra note 36. 
39 Id. 
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the government has a role in regulating the economy.40 Democrats believe that the government 
has an important role in regulating the nation’s economy.  As previously stated, the majority of 
Democrats polled trust the government to solve economic problems over business.41 Democrats 
tend to believe that the free market theory approach to the economy is inadequate and that the 
approaches of letting the market take care of inferior products and false claims will not result in 
accurate information for consumers.42 Democrats argue, “there are too many sellers” selling “too 
many products” and the features of these products able to change frequently over time making it 
hard for competitors to be able to expose false claims.43 Democrats tend to favor consumer 
protection programs as an alternative to putting the onus on consumers because consumer suits 
are infrequent and usually have a minimum jurisdictional amount.44 Ultimately, no matter the 
level of government involvement in regulating the economy, consumers should inform 
themselves on products and business practices.45 
Democrats not only say that they trust the government more than businesses to solve 
economic problems, they are also more likely to say that government should do more to regulate 
the nation’s economy.46 Thus, Democrats may be likely to pursue more consumer complaints 
regarding fraud or deception in attempts to ensure a fair marketplace.47  
 
                                               
40 BARBARA A. BARDES, MACK C. SHELLEY & STEFFEN W. SCHMIDT, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND 
POLITICS TODAY: THE ESSENTIALS 21 (17 ed. 2013). 
41 Newport, supra note 29. 
42 Pitofsky, supra note 24 at 663. 
43 Id. at 633. 
44 Id. at 667–668. 
45 Id. at 663. 
46 Newport, supra note 29. See Table 1. 
47 Provost, supra note 33 at 46. 
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C.  Regulation of Wisconsin Economy in Action 
 
In March of 2015, environmentalists criticized Republican Governor Scott Walker for 
decreased enforcement of environmental regulations by the state Department of Natural 
Resources (DNR).48 Under the Walker administration, fewer notices of environmental violations 
were issued; the DNR referred fewer cases for prosecution and overall the department took on 
fewer cases.49 The DNR under Walker’s first administration, 2011-2014, pursued nearly 47 
percent fewer cases than under Democrat Jim Doyle’s second term (2007-2010).50 The number 
of violations issued dropped 42 percent since Doyle’s final term to Walker’s first term. Finally, 
during Walker’s first term the DNR referred an average of 32 cases annually to the Department 
of Justice compared to an average of 68 cases referred annually under Doyle’s final term.51  
The seemingly lax enforcement of environmental regulations by a Republican governor 
illustrates the GOP ideology of less interference in the economy. Less responsibility is put on the 
government and more responsibility is put on the business sector. In theory, this same approach 
would be used by a Republican administration in regard to regulation of deceptive advertising.  
 
                                               
48 Lee Bergquist, DNR enforcement actions down under Scott Walker, JOURNAL SENTINEL, March 27, 2015, 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/dnr-enforcement-actions-down-under-scott-walker-dnr-enforcement-
actions-down-under-scott-walker-b994-297806681.html. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
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II. History of Wisconsin law  
 Despite being a multi-billion dollar industry, advertisers have long struggled to 
legitimatize their professional status and be seen as an ethical industry.52 The lack of respect 
towards the industry can be traced back to patent medicine advertising. Patent medicine creators 
spent large amounts of money to sell “cure all” tonics and concoctions that often failed to deliver 
the results their advertisements claimed users would experience.53 These advertisements were 
criticized for including unverified testimonials and many of these tonics proved to be harmful to 
users.54 The deceptive nature of some of these early patent medicines led to nearly an industry 
wide embargo on such advertisements.55  
 The need for a law addressing deceptive and fraudulent advertising messages stemmed 
from the advertising industry’s desire to legitimate the profession and mitigate government 
regulation through self-regulation.56 Around 1900, newspapers and magazines began to review 
advertisements in response to complaints about deceptive advertisements.57 Publishers were 
believed to have an important role in the advertising industry.58 Magazine publisher Cyrus H.K. 
Curtis published what is believed to be the first self-regulation advertising code, “Curtis 
                                               
52 Daniel Pope, “MAKING SENSE OF ADVERTISEMENTS,” HISTORY MATTERS: THE U.S. SURVEY COURSE ON 
THE WEB (2003), http://historymatters.gmu.edu/mse/Ads/, PAMELA WALKER LAIRD, ADVERTISING PROGRESS: 
AMERICAN BUSINESS AND THE RISE OF CONSUMER MARKETING (1998); Quentin J. Schultze, Professionalism in 
Advertising: The Origin of Ethical Codes, 31 J. COMMUN. 64 (1981). 
53 LAIRD, supra note 52 at 50. 
54 LAIRD, supra note 52. 
55 Jeffery S. Edelstein, Self-Regulation of Advertising: An Alternative to Litigation and Government Action, 43 JL TECH 
509, 515 (2003); LAIRD, supra note 52 at 222–223. 
56 Edelstein, supra note 55 at 515; COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW: 2014 EDITION, supra note 3 at 168. 
57 Edelstein, supra note 55 at 515. 
58 LAIRD, supra note 52 at 52. 
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Advertising Code,” in 1910.59 The code was created to protect Curtis’s magazine advertisers and 
readers “from all copy that is fraudulent or deceptive.”60 Curtis believed in truth in advertising.61 
Truthful advertising bolsters consumer confidence in the claims advertised; in turn advertisers 
benefit.62 
 In 1911, George P. Rowell, founder of the first national trade magazine for the 
advertising industry, Printers’ Ink, published a model statute dubbed “The Printers’ Ink 
Statute.”63 Printers’ Ink hired lawyer Harry D. Nims to write the statute that proposed to make 
the dissemination of deceptive or fraudulent advertising a misdemeanor.64 Through the Printers’ 
Ink periodical, editor John Romer encouraged Associated Advertising Clubs of America 
members to push the enactment of “The Printers’ Ink Statute” in all states.65 Associated 
Advertising Clubs were ardently supportive of the model statute because it established the 
industry’s notion of “ethicality as an economic resource.”66 Enactment came first with Ohio on 
February 26, 1913.67 Fourteen other states would introduce a version of “The Printers’ Ink 
Statute” in 1913, including Wisconsin.68 
                                               
59 Edelstein, supra note 55 at 515; LAIRD, supra note 52 at 222–223; Cyrus H.K. Curtis, ADVERTISING HALL OF 
FAME, http://advertisinghall.org/members/member_bio.php?memid=594. Curtis is the founder of the modern 
magazine and made noted contributions to the advertising profession. Curtis published the Ladies’ Home Journal and 
the Saturday Evening Post. 
60 Edelstein, supra note 55 at 515. 
61 Cyrus H.K. Curtis, supra note 59. 
62 Edelstein, supra note 55 at 509–510. 
63 Id. at 515.; GEORGE P. ROWELL, FORTY YEARS AN ADVERTISING AGENT 355–356 (2nd ed. 1926). 
64 CHRIS HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND POLICY 122–123 (2015); HARRY D. 
NIMS, NIMS ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE MARKS 634 (2 ed. 1917). 
65 Schultze, supra note 52 at 65. 
66 Id. at 66. 
67 POPE, supra note 1 at 206. 
68 Id. at 206. 
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 The Wisconsin Legislature enacted its law prohibiting deceptive advertising in 1913.69 
This multi-sectioned statute titled “Fraudulent representations” aimed to protect Wisconsin 
consumers from untrue, deceptive or misleading representations made to sell a product or service. 
Before the enactment of Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, in 1913, to determine 
liability against the defendant, the prosecution had to prove the defendant intended to deceive 
the public.70 Since 1962, statements can be found in violation of the statute even if they are 
literally true but leave a misleading impression.71  
The original language of the law read that no entity with the intent to sell may make or 
place before the public in a newspaper, magazine, or other publication an advertisement, 
statement, representation that is untrue, deceptive or misleading.72 The original language limited 
the law to printed advertisements. Eventually, the law was expanded to include oral, written and 
broadcast claims.73 
 The Wisconsin Legislature has modified the law over the years. In 1927, subsection (2) 
was added. Subsection (2) relates to buying and selling of products or services by private parties.74 
This subsection explicitly directs the seller or purchaser to indicate that the transaction is a 
                                               
69 Laws of Wisconsin Chapter 510, (1913), supra note 2 at 576–77. 
70 Cullen Goretzke, The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery Undermines the Pro-Consumer Trend in Wisconsin’s 
Misrepresentation Doctrine, 2003 WIS REV 171, 222 (2003); Mark R. Hinkston, Protecting Consumers in the Modern 
Age: Wisconsin’s Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 81 WIS. LAWYER (2008), 
http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/Article.aspx?Volume=81&Issue=10&ArticleID=
1596. Wisconsin statute 100.18 is often referred to as the Deceptive Trade Practices Act.  
71 Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., FRAUDULENT REPRESENTATIONS, ADVERTISING AND SALES 
CLAIMS; CF. MURRARY SPACE SHOE CORP. V. FTC, 304 F. 2D 270 (2D CIR. 1962). 
72 Kepner, supra note 5 at 186. 
73 Hinkston, supra note 70.; Automatic Merch. of Am. Inc., 437 64 Wis.2d 659 at 663. The statute has yet to be 
updated to include internet claims exclusively. Internet can be included in mulitple advertising mediums and or if a 
transaction takes place. 
74 Kepner, supra note 5 at 186. 
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“business concern and not a private party”.75 Subsection (3) regulated charity solicitations, 
requiring that any advertisement for charitable donations must disclose the amount of funds 
going directly to the charitable organization. Subsection (3) was added in 1941.76 In 1945, the 
language of the law was expanded to cover “any advertisement, announcement, statement or 
representation.”77 This amendment expanded the application of the statute to cover television 
and radio.78 In 1951, the Wisconsin Retail Gas Association requested legislation regulating 
standards for displaying gasoline prices. Thus subsection (5) was enacted and, as a result, some of 
the regulations overseen by the Department of Motor Vehicles were transferred to the 
Fraudulent Representations section.79 In 1955, another subsection was added to the Act, and 
many of the subsections were renumbered.80 In 1974, the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled ‘the 
public’ does not mandate statements need to be made to a large audience, but that one person 
constitutes as ‘the public’.81 
Representations are not limited to media advertisements, but oral and written statements 
or contracts are also included.82 The Deceptive Trade Practices Act was enacted to fill the legal 
holes that existed in common law protection for the state’s citizens.83 The 2014-15 language of 
the statute generally reads: no entity intending to sell any product or service or enter into a 
contract, relating to any product or service may make any untrue, deceptive or misleading 
                                               
75 Id. at 186. 
76 Id. at 186. Today subsection (3) is an expanded version of the 1927 subsection (2). 
77 Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., supra note 71.; Cf. Murrary Space Shoe Corp. V. FTC, 304 F. 
2d 270 (2nd Cir. 1962).  
78 WISCONSIN, WISCONSIN SESSION LAWS 1945 Chapter 399, 652 (1945). 
79 Kepner, supra note 5 at 187. 
80 Kepner, supra note 5. (Today subsesction (6) deals with gas price displays.) 
81 State v. Automatic Merchandisers of America, Inc., 64 Wis. 2d 659, 663, 221 N.W. 2d 683, 686, (1974). 
82 Id. 437 64 Wis. 2d 659 662, 663 (1974). 
83 Hinkston, supra note 70 at 81. 
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representation in combination with such dealings.84 Thus, under the law, theoretically, the state 
could prosecute an individual even if intent to deceive wasn’t present and not harm was done. 
The following standards must be met for the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection and or the Department of Justice to take action against an entity accused 
of distributing a fraudulent representation: 
1. The defendant has intentionally made a public depiction (advertisement, statement or 
other representation).  
2. The depiction is presented as factual but is, in fact, false, deceptive or misleading. 
3. The plaintiff or the public (if the plaintiff is the State on behalf of the public) has suffered 
monetary loss as a result of the deceptive depiction.85  
Individuals found in violation of the law face penalties including fines and official 
sanctions and the possibility of imprisonment.86 Intent to deceive does not need to be proved by 
                                               
84 Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, ADVERTISING AND SALES CLAIMS: FRAUDULENT 
REPRESENTATIONS, http://datcp.wi.gov/uploads/Consumer/pdf/FraudulentRepresentationsDetails.pdf. Wisconsin 
statute 100.18 (1) reads in its entirety “No person, firm, corporation or association, or agent or employe [sic] 
thereof, with intent to sell, distribute, increase the consumption of or in any wise dispose of any real estate, 
merchandise, securities, employment, service, or anything offered by such person, firm, corporation or association, or 
agent or employe [sic] thereof, directly or indirectly, to the public for sale, hire, use or other distribution, or with 
intent to induce the public in any manner to enter into any contract or obligation relating to the purchase, sale, hire, 
use or lease of any real estate, merchandise, securities, employment or service, shall make, publish, disseminate, 
circulate, or place before the public, or cause, directly or indirectly, to be made, published, disseminated, circulated, 
or placed before the public, in this state, in a newspaper, magazine or other publication, or in the form of a book, 
notice, handbill, poster, bill, circular, pamphlet, letter, sign, placard, card, label, or over any radio or television 
station, or in any other way similar or dissimilar to the foregoing, an advertisement, announcement, statement or 
representation of any kind to the public relating to such purchase, sale, hire, use or lease of such real estate, 
merchandise, securities, service or employment or to the terms or conditions thereof, which advertisement, 
announcement, statement or representation contains any assertion, representation or statement of fact which is 
untrue, deceptive or misleading.” 
85 Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32, ¶ 39, 270 Wis. 2d. 146. See also Wis. JI-Civil 2418.  
86 WIS. STAT. TIT. 100, supra note 5. Only the violation of §100.18 (9) and §100.182 carry the possibility of 
imprisonment. 
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the plaintiff for a seller to be found guilty under the statute.87 Sellers can be found guilty of 
deceptive advertising under the law even without proof of anyone being deceived.88 
Once a complaint of deceptive advertising is made to the Department of Agriculture, 
Trade and Consumer Protection there are many possible ways in which that complaint can be 
resolved. Complaints are handled by the Consumer Protection Bureau Organization, which 
operates within the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection. The Bureau is 
located in Madison and is structured into several units.89 As of 2015, the work units consist of 33 
employees in the following departments: administration and outreach, consumer information 
hotline, compliant administration, investigation, and privacy protection.90 
According to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, the 
Consumer Protection Bureau receives on average of 12,000 to 15,000 consumer complaints 
annually.91 The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection estimates that 
upwards of two thirds of these initial complaints are resolved during initial communication 
simply by informing these individuals of their “legal rights and options for further actions.92 The 
nearly one third of the complaints that aren’t resolved during initial contact are resolved primarily 
within the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection (see Figure 3). 
87 Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, supra note 84. 
88 Id. 
89 Paul Ferguson & Michael Steinschneider, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 85,
2015 7–8 (2015). 
90 Id. at 8. 
91 Christopher Pollek, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 75, 2003 8 (2003); 
Christopher Pollek & Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 79 8 (2005), 
http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lfb/publications/Informational-Papers/Pages/Info_2005.aspx; Christopher Pollek & Paul 
Onsager, INFORMATIONAL PAPER 84 CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS 9 (2007); Paul Ferguson & Paul 
Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 86 11 (2013); Ferguson and 
Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 15. 
92 Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 14. 
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Figure 393 
Process by which a consumer complaint gets resolved
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93 Id. at 14-17. Other refers to other jurisdictions or DATCP for further DATCP action.
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A.  History of Regulatory Responsibility 
The Department of the Treasury Agent was specifically created for the regulation of 
“peddlers,” “transient merchants,” “showmen” and closeout sales in 1872.94  Thus, in 1913, it
probably seemed like a good department to oversee deceptive advertising.95 During this time, the 
Office of Dairy and Food Commissioner regulated food, drink, and drugs.96 In 1929, regulation 
of deceptive advertising fell to the Department of Agriculture when the Department of 
Agriculture absorbed the Office of Dairy and Food Commissioner.97
The 1960s brought about a national “consumerism” trend in the United States.
Wisconsin was not immune to this trend. The Department of Agriculture’s consumer protection
enforcement role came under attack because of the consumerism trend.98 The attack was twofold. First 
came the push to change the name of the Department of Agriculture to encompass better 
its role in trade regulations and consumer protection matters.99 Secondly, efforts by Wisconsin
legislature were being made to transfer the enforcement of consumer protection matters to the 
Department of Justice.100 Proponents of the transfer of duties believed that a “statewide law 
zed
ee
of
be
this
94 General Laws Passed by the Legislature of Wisconsin, (1872), http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1872/related/acts/177.pdf; Kepner, supra note 5 at 185. 
95 General Laws Passed by the Legislature of Wisconsin, supra note 94. In 1872, chapter 117, section 1 authorithe governor to appoint a “suitable person” to act as “treasury agent,” the duty of the treasury agent was to overs
“and enforce if necessary under the provisions thereof, the collection of fees dues for license fixed by chapter 72 
the general laws of 1870, relating to ‘hawkers and peddlers,’ and also to enforce the collection of fees required to
paid into the state treasury for any license to transact business under the provisions of any other existing law of 
state.” 
96 A history of consumer protection in Wisconsin, THE JOURNAL TIMES (1998), http://journaltimes.com/new s /a-
history-of-consumer-protection-in-wisconsin/article_3932d947-af4f-598c-b195-098603d435db.html. 
97 Kepner, supra note 5 at 185; A history of consumer protection in Wisconsin, supra note 96. 
98 James D. Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business Practices in Wisconsin, 57 MAR Q
REV 559, 562 (1974). 
99 Id. at 562. 
100 Id. at 562–63. 
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enforcement agency” with more legal expertise was needed to reduce consumer fraud.101 The 
Department of Agriculture and Wisconsin businesses opposed the transfer of consumer 
protection matters to the attorney general’s office, claiming that an elected official should not 
handle consumer protection matters.102 
However, at the time, the only states that did not place the responsibility of enforcement 
of deceptive trade practices with the attorney general’s office were Wisconsin, Virginia and 
Florida.103 Wisconsin businesses opposed transferring consumer protection matters to the 
Department of Justice because they were acting in their own interest. The typical state 
department of agriculture functions not as a regulatory agency, but more as a protector of the 
interests of producers, such as “farmers, farm co-ops, and food processors,” rather than protecting 
the interests of consumers.104 In contrast to the typical state department of agriculture, the 
attorneys in the attorney general’s office are legal experts, and would be more likely to vigorously 
proceed with prosecution under state legislation, acting on the consumer’s behalf.105 
In 1961, two Democratic sponsored bills proposed to transfer the Department of 
Agriculture’s consumer protection authority to the attorney general’s office.106 These bills as well 
as two like bills introduced in 1963, failed.107 The 1963 bills failed even with bipartisan 
101 Id. at 563. In 1951, the Wisconsin legislature did give the attorney general the ability to file complaints but the 
Department of Agriculture still held the majority of enforcement responsibility. While the attorney general was 
authorized to file complaints, the Department of Agriculture still had the authority to hear and throw out 
complaints filed. 
102 Id. at 563. 
103 William A. Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, TULANE LAW REV. 724–757, 734 (1972). 
104 Id. at 735. 
105 Id. at 735. 
106 Jeffries, supra note 98 at 563. Governor Gaylord Nelson (D) Attorney General John Reynolds (D) were 
supportive of these two bills. 
107 Id. at 563–64. 
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support.108 Again, from 1965 to 1968, Attorney General Bronson LaFollette (D) supported a bill 
based on the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.109 The bill would have granted the attorney general’s 
office investigative and injunctive authority as well as have created a comprehensive consumer 
fraud law in Wisconsin.110 Although the LaFollette supported bill ultimately failed, it fared far 
better than its predecessors, passing unanimously in the State Assembly, but failing in the State 
Senate by a narrow vote.111 The continued attempt to strip the Department of Agriculture of its 
consumer protection authority and transfer that authority to the Attorney General’s Office 
undoubtedly created a hostile and feuding atmosphere between the two state agencies.112  
In 1969, the Republican governor and Republican attorney general sought to end the 
ongoing feud between the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Justice over 
consumer protection issues.113 Negotiations between the two agencies resulted in an interagency 
relationship through a memorandum of understanding.114 Both agencies agreed to coordinate 
investigation and enforcement procedures in matters of consumer protection and trade 
practices.115 The coordination between the two agencies resulted in an “integrated complaint 
processing system,” in which the Department of Agriculture would investigate complaints to 
                                               
108 Id. at 564. The 1963 bills had the bipartisan support of Democratic Governor Gaylord Nelson and Republican 
Attorney General George Thompson. 
109 Id. at 564.; ILL. STAT. ANN. CH. 121 1/2 (SMITH-HURD SUPP.1972). 
110 Jeffries, supra note 98 at 564. 
111 Id. at footnote 564. 
112 Id. at 564. 
113 Id. at 564. Warren Knowles was the governor and Robert Warren was the attorney general in 1963. 
114 Id. at 564.; WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN BLUE BOOK 448 
(1970), 
https://books.google.com/books?id=_ccqAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA448&lpg=PA448&dq=Cooperative+consumer+prot
ection+agreement+between+the+Wisconsin+Department+of+Justice+and+the+WIsconsin+Department+of+agricultu
re+1969&source=bl&ots=0q-
2EvWQuE&sig=FoAETsJ3luIVXL9BQuWs6QrB6ps&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiL7dfJyrvJAhXLOz4KHZg
VB-0Q6AEIKjAC#v=onepage&q=consumer%20protection&f=false.  
115 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, supra note 114 at 448. The cooperation agreement was 
reached in June of 1969. 
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determine the merit of the complaint and refer law violations the Department of Justice for 
prosecution.116 Before the year was out it became clear that cooperative agreement between the 
two agencies wasn’t working. The Department of Justice’s authority over civil prosecutions was 
believed to be “makeshift and inadequate.”117 The attorney general launched an in-depth 
investigation of the “...resources, programs and statutes in the consumer fraud field.”118 The 
investigation resulted in a 240-page report that made several legislative recommendations, 
including modifying the Department of Agriculture’s consumer protection role to regulatory 
rather than enforcement.119 
As a result of this investigation, a bill was submitted to the Wisconsin Legislature for 
consideration on October 10, 1969.120  This bill proposed giving the Department of Justice and 
local district attorneys more authority in the enforcement of fraudulent representations and 
unfair trade practices.121 The bill also sought to grant investigative powers of consumer 
protection issues to the DOJ while removing the Department of Agriculture’s authority over the 
statute.122 Ultimately the bill did not pass, but a compromise bill was signed into law on February 
1970.123 This new legislation did not result in a substantial change in the statutes, though it did 
strengthen civil enforcement for violation of trade practice and consumer protection laws.124 It 
                                               
116 Jeffries, supra note 98 at 564. 
117 Id. at 565. 
118 Id. at 565. 
119 Id. at 565. 
120 WIS. S.B. 701, (1969); Jeffries, supra note 98 at 566. 
121 WIS. S.B. 701, supra note 120; Jeffries, supra note 98 at 566. (Sections 100.18 and 100.20). 
122 WIS. S.B. 701, supra note 120; Jeffries, supra note 98 at 566. 
123  WISCONSIN SESSION LAWS 1389 (1969). 
124 Jeffries, supra note 98 at 567. 
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was also through this compromise bill that the Office of Consumer Protection within the Justice 
Department was created.125  
In 1991, Republican Governor Tommy Thompson vetoed the Democratic-controlled 
Legislature’s request to transfer some of the Department of Agriculture’s consumer protection 
duties to the Department of Justice.126 This same year Democrat James Doyle was sworn in as 
the attorney general. Again in 1992, the Democratic-controlled Legislature sought to transfer 
some consumer protection duties to the Department of Justice and once again, Thompson 
vetoed the proposal.127 Thompson vetoed the proposed transfer of selected consumer trade and 
trade regulation programs to the Department of Justice partially because he claimed it would 
“abolish positions” and that there was a lack of “policy, programmatic or administrative 
justification for the transfer.”128 Furthermore, Thompson said that the transfer would not yield 
any “administrative efficiencies or material cost savings.”129 Thompson stated that it was 
“imperative that the consumer protection responsibilities remain at an agency governed by a 
citizen board.”130 
The 1994 election brought about a Republican-controlled legislature.131 Doyle was still 
the state’s attorney general. In efforts to minimize Doyle’s power over consumer protection issues 
as attorney general, Governor Thompson urge the Legislature to shift the consumer protection 
                                               
125 A history of consumer protection in Wisconsin, supra note 96. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 State of Wisconsin Senate Journal Ninetieth Regular Session, 907 (1992), 
https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/journals/senate/19920505.pdf. 
129 Id. at 907. 
130 State of Wisconsin Senate Journal Ninetieth Regular Session, supra note 125 at 907. 
131 A history of consumer protection in Wisconsin, supra note 96. 
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matters from the Department of Justice to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection as part of the 1995-97 state budget.132  
On July 1, 1996, the Department of Justice was stripped of most of its authority under 
the Fraudulent Representations Statute to regulate and prosecute “untrue, deceptive or 
misleading” representations under 1995 Wisconsin Act 27.133 Positions at the Department of 
Justice were either removed or transferred to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection.134 The majority of the state’s authority was transferred to the Department 
of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection.135 Before the transfer of authority to the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, either or both of the departments 
had the authority to “enforce violations of consumer protection laws.”136  Under Act 27, the 
following responsibilities were transferred from the Department of Justice to the Department of 
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection:137 
 • Fraudulent representations; 
 • Fraudulent drug advertising; 
 • Penalties for violations of DATCP rules relating to methods of competition     
    and trade practices; 
 • Motor vehicle rust proofing warranties; 
 • Substantiation of energy savings and safety claims; 
 • Penalties: marketing and trade practices; 
 • Sale of cleaning agents and water conditioners containing phosphorus; 
 • Products containing or made with ozone-depleting substances; 
 • Ticket refunds; 
 • Cable television subscriber rights; 
 • Dating service contracts; 
                                               
132 Id. 
133 Legislative Fiscal Bureau, JOINT COMMITTEE ON FINANCE TRANSFER CONSUMER PROTECTION FUNCTIONS 
(AGRICULTURE, TRADE AND CONSUMER PROTECTION) 5-6 (2005). 
134 Id. at 6. 
135 Pollek, supra note 91. 
136 Id. 
137 Legislative Fiscal Bureau, supra note 133 at 6. 
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 • Fitness center and weight reduction contracts; 
 • Pawnbrokers and secondhand article and jewelry dealers; 
 • Prize notices; 
 • Mail-order sales regulated; 
 • Motor fuel dealerships; 
 • Future service plans; 
 • Vehicles-financial responsibility: damage waivers and penalties; 
 • Self-service storage facilities; 
 • Time share ownership deposits, escrow requirements remedies and penalties;  
     and 
  • Prepaid maintenance liens. 
Since 1996, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection has had the 
authority to make rules and enforce consumer protection laws.138 The Department of Justice has 
the authority to determine violations of consumer protection laws, as well as initiate prosecution 
for violations.139 However, the Department of Justice can proceed with the prosecution of 
deceptive, fraudulent or misleading representations only after checking with the Department of 
Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection first.140 The Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection has the authority to bring about court action against alleged violators of 
the fraudulent representations law. However, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection requests that the DOJ represent the state in court in deceptive 
representation cases.141 
 
 
                                               
138 Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 1. 
139 Id. at 2. 
140 Id. at 2. 
141 Id. at 3. 
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B.  Governmental Enforcement of the Law 
 
 Wisconsin consumer protection laws are intended to protect consumers from illegal 
business practices including fraud, deceptive advertising and pressure sales methods. The 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection enforces consumer protection laws.  
 The Bureau of Consumer Protection along with two other bureaus in the Division of 
Trade and Consumer Protection oversees the programs related to consumer protection issues.142 
The 2014-2015 budget, under Governor Scott Waller, allows the Bureau 33 positions, nearly a 
48 percent decrease in the number of positions from the 63 positions in 2012-2013 and the 
elimination of the regulation and safety section unit.143 Additionally, before December of 2009 
the Bureau had a central office in Madison and regional offices in Madison, Wauwatosa, Eau 
Claire and Green Bay.144 The regional offices have since been cut and the only Bureau of 
Consumer Protection office is located in Madison. The cut is likely due to the approximately 2.7 
million dollar budget cut to the Consumer Protection Program’s budget.145 As well as further 
implementation of the fewer consumer protection and government regulations, and letting the 
free market control the quality and messaging of goods through product competition.146 The 
2014-2015 Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection consumer protection 
                                               
142 Id. at 7. 
143 Ferguson and Onsager, supra note 91 at 5; Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 7. 
144 Ferguson and Onsager, supra note 91 at 6. 
145 Id. at 6.; Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 6. 
146 Pitofsky, supra note 24 at 664. 
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staff consists of administration, consumer information/education, complaint administration, 
investigation, and privacy protection.147  
 Other consumer protection resources are available through other state agencies. The 
Department of Justice maintains consumer protection resources for Wisconsin consumers via its 
website and Consumer Protection and Antitrust Unit.148 The Department of Justice’s Consumer 
Protection and Antitrust Unit is responsible for the enforcement of  “laws that protect consumers 
and businesses, including laws that prohibit deception, fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment 
of facts in the sale or advertisement of goods and services.”149 Through the website consumers 
can file a complaint as well as gain access to consumer resources, including how to file a 
complaint.150 In reality, the Department of Justice does not field complaints but redirects a 
consumer to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection’s website.151 The 
primary duty of the Department of Justice’s Consumer Protection and Antitrust Unit is to 
litigate cases referred by other state agencies such as the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection and the Department of Financial Institutions.152 The Department of 
Justice’s consumer protection staff also works with other states in multi-state litigation as well as 
the Federal Trade Commission in national consumer protection matters.153 The unit seeks to 
                                               
147 Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 8. 
148 Wisconsin Department of Justice, CONSUMER PROTECTION HOME WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/dls/consumer-protection/consumer (last visited Apr 9, 2015). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Wisconsin Department of Justice, HOW TO FILE A CONSUMER COMPLAINT WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF 
JUSTICE, https://www.doj.wisconsin.gov/dls/consumer-protection/how-file-consumer-complaint (last visited Apr 6, 
2015). 
152 Wisconsin Department of Justice, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND ANTITRUST UNIT WISCONSIN 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, https://www.doj.wisconsin.gov/dls/consumer-protection-and-antitrust-unit (last visited 
Apr 6, 2015). 
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stop deceptive and fraudulent practices through various enforcement actions, including filing 
lawsuits, injunctions, an imposition of fines, and restitution.154 
The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection aims to settle cases of 
alleged fraudulent advertising reported to its Consumer Protection Bureau within the 
Department.155 If the Consumer Protection Bureau is not able to resolve the case, it is referred to 
the Department of Justice.156 If the case is referred to the Department of Justice, it is not 
uncommon for the issue to be settled without going to court. Cases referred to the DOJ for 
prosecution are tried in the county Circuit Court from which the complaint orginated. The vast 
majority of complaints that go to court are tried and settled in the Dane County Circuit Court.157  
Wisconsin’s history shows a long contention between Democratic and Republican 
politicians regarding consumer protection and where the authority to act in the interests of 
consumers ought to be. The many attempts by Wisconsin Democrats to move consumer 
protection issues to the Department of Justice, and the refusal of Wisconsin Republicans to let 
that happen suggests a causal relationship between the political party of elected officials has an 
impact on the level of regulation of deceptive advertising. More specifically, I hypothesize the 
following: 
Hypotheses:  
H1. When the governor is a Democrat and the attorney general is a Democrat the attorney 
general’s office will prosecute more deceptive advertising cases and more individual defendants 
                                               
154 Id. 
155 Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 17. 
156 Id. at 2. 
157 This information is based on the data collected from case filings from 2003 through 2014. 
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than when the governor and the attorney general are Republicans. Tables 3 through 6 will show 
results related to this hypothesis. 
H2.    In cases that have fines; fines will be larger under an all-Democrat term. Tables 7 through 
12 will show results related to this hypothesis. 
H3.   When there is an all-Democratic term the percentage of guilty outcomes of cases and 
individual defendants will be higher than the percentage of guilty outcomes in cases that spill 
into the mixed term or all-Republican term. Tables 13.1 through 16.2 will show results related to 
this hypothesis.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY 
I.  Analysis of Wisconsin Deceptive Advertising Cases  
 My hypothesis suggests that there is a causal relationship between the political party of 
elected officials and the level of government regulation of the economy. The primary method for 
studying causal relationships is experiments.158 To identify a causal relationship occurring 
naturally in society I have to look at past governmental interactions with the regulation of 
deceptive advertising in Wisconsin. Politicians often make decisions that can be observed and 
analyzed, creating a natural social science experiment.159 Natural experiments are empirical 
studies in which variables and control conditions are determined by nature or factors outside of 
the researcher's control.  
Using a natural experiment, I analyzed the patterns of prosecutions of deceptive 
advertising by the attorney general’s office from 2003 through 2014. 160 The subjects of this 
experiment are already in pre-determined groups and have not been randomly assigned. The 
conditions of this experiment are beyond my control. Therefore, there is no control group. This 
experiment, conducted in a real-life environment is more likely to reflect natural occurrences 
because of its setting outside of a laboratory.161 The independent variable, political party 
affiliation, has not been manipulated. This experiment studies past events and it is expected that 
behaviors exhibited by the governmental departments are natural.162 While this natural design 
                                               
158 EARL BABBIE, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH 249 (12 ed. 2010). 
159 Id. at 248. 
160 Id. at 248. 
161 Saul McLeod, EXPERIMENTAL METHOD SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY.ORG, 
http://www.simplypsychology.org/experimental-method.html. 
162 Id. 
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occurred in Wisconsin, a replication of this study could be replicated at a different point in 
Wisconsin’s history or in other states.  
Ideally, I would have liked to study the prosecution patterns of the fraudulent 
representations statute under in a term of a Republican governor and a Democratic attorney 
general. But the opportunity hasn’t presented itself within the last 12 years. Other limitations of 
this study are the lack of randomization and control conditions.163 Additionally, while I believe 
the list of cases obtained during this study is comprehensive, there is a possibility not all cases 
charged with the violation of the Fraudulent Representations Statute are accounted for from 
2003 through 2014. A large number of cases were obtained from Court Data Technologies in 
Madison, Wisconsin. Court Data Technologies is an independent consulting firm that 
specializes in searching data that is publicly available through Wisconsin Circuit Court Access 
(WCCA), also known as the Consolidated Courts Automations Programs (CCAP). While there 
is a wealth of information to be had via the CCAP website, the search options are limited. Court 
Data Technologies was able to provide me with a detailed spreadsheet containing state 
prosecutions of alleged violations of the deceptive advertising statute. Additionally, at the request 
of my advisor, Professor David Pritchard, the attorney general’s office emailed a list of cases and 
investigations pursued by the Department of Justice.164 
The experiment deals with prosecutions in Wisconsin and 12 counties. Wisconsin cases 
were chosen because of my physical presence in the state and because Wisconsin, along with the 
                                               
163 Thad Dunning, Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural Experiments, 61 POLIT. RES. Q. 
282, 290 (2008).  
164 In February of 2015, my advisor, Professor David Pritchard, contacted Assistant Attorney General Lara 
Sutherlin, via email, asking for a list of state prosecutions for alleged violations of §100.18. a list of prosecutions and 
investigations pursued by the DOJ was emailed to Professor Pritchard in March of 2015. See Appendix A and B for 
a list of all state litigated deceptive advertising cases. 
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Midwest has often been hailed the most representative region in the United States.165 Of 
Wisconsin’s 72 counties, only 23 have filed a deceptive advertising case from 2003 through 
2014.166 The 12 counties included in this study were chosen for various reasons. Dane County 
was chosen out of necessity. Twenty-nine of the 79 cases were filed in Dane County. Milwaukee 
County had the second highest number of cases filed. The remaining counties were chosen 
because they fit one of the following criteria: proximity to Milwaukee, or all relevant information 
was available on CCAP and or in papers published by the state of Wisconsin.167 
  In 2002, Wisconsin voters elected Democrats, Governor Jim Doyle and Attorney 
General Peg Lautenschlager. In 2006, Republican J.B. Van Hollen replaced Attorney General 
Lautenschlager, and then 2010 Republican Scott Walker was elected governor. Table 2 
illustrates the break down of elected officials.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
165 Mark Preston, THE MOST “REPRESENTATIVE” STATE: WISCONSIN CNN (2006), 
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/07/27/mg.thu/; Andy Kiersz, REVEALED: THE AL STATES IN AMERICA 
BUSINESS INSIDER (2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-average-states-in-america-2014-4?op=1. 
166 See Table 20 and Appendix A for a list of all counties and cases filed from 2003-2014. 
167 The 12 counties included in this study are: Brown, Crawford, Dane, Kenosha, Marinette, Milwaukee, 
Outagamie, Racine, Vilas, Waukesha, Winnebago, and Wood. Not all counties surrounding Milwaukee are 
represented in this study because either a lack of filings in those counties, or in the case of Ozaukee County, only 
one of the three case files could be located at the time I called. 
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Table 2 
Elected officials breakdown 
 
Years in office 
 
Governor and attorney general 
 
2003-2007 
 
 
Democratic officials: Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
 
2007-2011 
 
 
Democratic/Republican officials: Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
 
2011-2015 
 
 
Republican officials: Walker/Van Hollen 
*Note: Elections are held in even years opposite of the presidential election. The governor takes office the first 
Monday in January of the following year. This table reflects the governor and attorney general terms, not when 
they were elected.  
 
I analyzed cases filed in circuit court from January 2003 through December 2014. I coded 
56 cases filed in twelve counties.168 Counties were selected by the number of cases filed in the 
county, the county’s proximity to Milwaukee, and or the availability of case details on Wisconsin 
Circuit Court Access, also known as CCAP or other government documents.169 Multistate and 
federal litigations were not included in this study. Cases are defined in terms of the alleged 
violation(s) of the statute against a business or individual(s) and not defined in terms of the 
                                               
168 Counties included in the study are: Brown, Crawford, Dane, Kenosha, Marinette, Milwaukee, Outagamie, 
Racine, Vilas, Waukesha, Winnebago, and Wood. Visits to over 20 counties in which deceptive advertising cases 
were filed was not feasible.  
169 Government documents containing pertinent details on selected deceptive advertising cases were found in 
governmental informational papers published biannually by the Wisconsin Legislative Fiscal Bureau. 
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number of individuals charged with the violation(s).170 In some cases there are multiple 
defendants. Each defendant is able to have a separate attorney. For this study, cases will not 
defined by the number of individuals charged for alleged violations, but rather the violation(s) 
filed simultaneously against an entity. I also analyzed expanded cases. Expanded cases are defined 
as the individuals charged with violating the statute in conjunction with business or nonprofit 
company.  
Each case is given a unique number by the county prosecuting the case. Cases with 
multiple defendants are distinguished by adding a letter at the end of the unique code. The cases 
involved in this study are public record. Case files are available at county court houses for the 
public to look through. I coded variables I coded each case for are as follows:171  
• Administration: the type of elected officials in place at the time of the case’s filing 
was coded to determine the number of cases prosecuted during specific time 
period. 
• Outcome: each case’s outcome was coded in accordance to the administration at 
the time of filing and at the time of conclusion of the case. Outcomes were coded 
for individual defendants as well. 
• Penalties: the median penalties ordered by the court for each case was coded for. 
• Restitution: the median amount of restitution ordered by the court for each case 
was coded. 
• Total forfeitures: the median total forfeiture ordered by the court for each case 
was coded. 
• Number of defendants: the number of individual defendants for each case was 
coded. 
• Advertising medium: the type of advertising medium allegedly in violation was 
coded. 
An analysis of state prosecutions of the statute from January 2003 through December 2014 will 
provide empirical evidence to test my hypotheses.  
                                               
170 In some cases there are multiple alleged violations of §100.18. Each count of alleged violation of §100.18 does 
not equal a case, but rather the collection of alleged violations filed simultaneously.  
171 See Appendix C for the coding sheet used for this study. 
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The information needed to code these cases was obtained from multiple sources. 
Wisconsin Court Systems Circuit Court Access (CCAP) was used to gather basic information, 
such as the dates cases were filed and closed, outcome of the case and any other cross-referenced 
cases. Information was also gathered from government documents such as Department of Justice 
press releases and informational papers. Finally, the bulk of the information used to code these 
cases came from manually pulling the case files in courthouses throughout Wisconsin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
39 
CHAPTER 4: FINDINGS 
 At the most basic level, my research aimed to identify a connection between political 
party of the governor and the attorney general and the level of enforcement of regulation over 
deceptive advertising. My hypotheses predict that (1) more deceptive advertising cases will be 
prosecuted by Democrats than by Republicans; (2) the median fine will be larger when the 
governor and attorney general are both Democrats; and (3) a Democratic governor and 
Democratic attorney general in office will result in a higher percentage of guilty outcomes.  
This chapter has tables that represent findings for deceptive advertising cases identified in 
all Wisconsin counties from 2003 through 2014 as well as findings for the deceptive advertising 
cases coded entirely for select Wisconsin counties. Findings for individual defendants in a case 
are also represented in the following tables. The tables are color coded for ease of reading see the 
key below. 
Figure 4: 
Table Color Coding Key for Tables 3-27: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Refers to cases in all Wisconsin counties 
 
Refers to the 56 cases identified in selected Wisconsin counties 
 
Refers to the 97 individual defendants identified in the 56 selected cases 
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I. Hypotheses Findings 
A. Hypothesis 1 Findings 
Based on the information I received from Court Data Technologies and the Attorney 
General’s office I was able to identify 79 different complaints or individual cases filed in 
Wisconsin Circuit Courts (see Table 3). The breakdown of the cases identified from 2003 
through 2014 is as follows: 42 cases filed during the first term (Democratic governor and 
attorney general), 23 cases filed during the second term (Democratic governor and Republican 
attorney general) and 14 cases filed during the third term (Republican governor and attorney 
general). On average, the all-Democratic term filed 10.5 allegedly deceptive advertising cases in 
Wisconsin Circuit Courts annually. The mixed term, on average, filed 5.75 cases annually, and 
the all-Republican term filed an average of 3.5 cases annually. During the Doyle/Van Hollen 
term, roughly half as many deceptive advertising cases were filed compared to during the 
Doyle/Lautenschlager term and during the Walker/Van Hollen term, only a third of the number 
of cases as the all-Democrat term were filed. 
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Table 3 
Complaints filed in circuit court per term in all Wisconsin counties 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of 
complaints yearly 
 
Complaints per term 
 
Percentage of 
complaints per term 
included 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
  2003-16 
2004-9 
2005-8 
2006-9 
 
42 
 
27 (64.3%) 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
2007-7 
2008-2 
2009-7 
2010-7 
 
23 
 
17 (73.9%) 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
2011-2 
2012-4 
2013-3 
2014-5 
 
14 
 
12 (85.7%) 
Total Complaints 79 79 56 (70.9%) 
*Note: These cases do not represent multi-state litigation or federal litigation. 
  
 From the 79 total cases identified, I was able to code for 56 (70.9%) unique cases in select 
counties. Of the 56 cases included in this study, 27 were filed in the first four-year term, 17 were 
filed in the second four-year term, and 12 were filed in the third four-year term (see Table 4). I 
was able to code 70.88% of the cases identified. For each four-year term, I was able to code over 
50% of the cases filed in the four-year span. Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate a clear decline in the 
number of complaints filed per four-year term. While the decline does not appear as drastic in 
  
 
42 
Table 4, it should be noted that only 64% of the cases identified in the all-Democratic term were 
coded for. I was able to code for 73.9% of the mixed term cases and 85.7% of the all-Republican 
term cases. 
Table 4 
Complaints filed in circuit court per term in select Wisconsin counties 
 
Governor/attorney general  
 
 
Number of complaints yearly 
 
 
Complaints per term 
 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
2003-6 
2004-5 
2005-7 
2006-9 
 
27 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
2007-5 
2008-2 
2009-3 
2010-7 
 
17 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
2011-1 
2012-4 
2013-2 
2014-5 
 
12 
Total 56 56 
 *Note: Counties included in this study include: Brown, Crawford, Dane, Kenosha, Marinette, Milwaukee, 
Outagamie, Racine, Vilas, Waukesha, Winnebago, and Wood. 
  
 The picture isn’t as clear regarding defendants. Before 2005, all alleged deceptive 
advertising violations were filed as civil cases, and multiple defendants were included under the 
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same case number. Sometime in 2005, alleged deceptive advertising violations began to be filed 
as complex forfeiture cases. By 2007, all of the cases I looked at were coded as complex forfeiture 
cases. Assistant Attorney General Lara Sutherlin revealed that the change in the labeling of the 
cases was court mandated when I interviewed her in December of 2015. Additionally, with the 
case designation of complex forfeiture, each individual defendant or individual 
business/nonprofit is separated off by a letter designation, indicating that there are multiple 
defendants in the case and each defendant has the opportunity to have their own lawyer.172 
Under a complex forfeiture case, while the alleged violation is considered a single case by the 
Department of Justice, any other individual or business can be named individually and has the 
opportunity to have separate legal representation.173 Ultimately, multiple individuals and 
organizations can be charged for the same violation. 
  Table 5 shows the number and type of defendants charged with violating the deceptive 
advertising statute during each four-year term for all 79 cases identified in this study. The total 
number of complaints or cases filed in the circuit court was 79 from 2003 through 2014 with 125 
individual defendants. The number of defendants prosecuted in a four-year period in all 
Wisconsin counties by four-year term was: All-Democratic term, 42; Democratic and 
Republican term, 57, and All-Republican term 26.  The numbers imply that during the Doyle 
(D)/Van Hollen (R) term, more individuals were prosecuted for deceptive advertising than 
during any other four-year term. However, because of the change in case designation from a civil 
case to a complex forfeiture case, the numbers do not give a clear picture. 
                                               
172 Telephone Interview with Lara Sutherlin, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Dec. 
4, 2015). 
173 Id. 
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Table 5 
Number of defendants in a four-year period in all Wisconsin counties 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
 
Business/organization 
defendants 
 
Individual defendants 
 
Total 
 
Doyle (D) / 
Lautenschlager (D) 
 
35 
 
7 
 
42 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen 
(R) 
 
33 
 
24 
 
57 
 
Walker (R) / Van 
Hollen (R) 
 
12174 
 
14175 
 
26176 
Total 80 45 125 
*Note: These cases do not represent any multi-state litigation or federal litigation. 
 
 During the Doyle (D)/Lautenschlager (D) term, 35 different organizations were 
prosecuted, and seven separate individuals were prosecuted for a total of 42 cases and separate 
alleged violations of the statute. The defendants during the Doyle (D)/Van Hollen (R) and 
Walker (R)/Van Hollen (R) term do not represent individual cases, but rather cases with 
multiple defendants. Many of the individuals named in cases during the second and third terms 
studied are the proprietor(s) of the organizations responsible for disseminating allegedly 
                                               
174 Dane County case, 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. Four business were added to the DOJ’s 
complaint, 2014CXF-I. Because these were filed after December 2014, they are not included in this study. 
175 Dane County Case, 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. Three individuals were added to the DOJ’s 
complaint, 2014CXC-E. Because these individuals were filed after December 2014, they are not included in this 
study. 
176 Dane County Case, 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. The amended complaint added 
2014CX53C-I, bringing total number of defendants to 30. The additions of these seven defendants were filed after 
December 2014, and are not included in this study. 
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deceptive advertising. It appears that the second part of H1 is supported based on Table 5. 
However, without knowing how many individuals or subsidiarity organizations were a part of the 
2003 through 2006 cases, the second part of H1 cannot be fully supported. 
 This study looked at 56 deceptive advertising cases in depth. Of those 56 cases, 97 
individual defendants were named. The breakdown of these defendants is shown in Table 6.             
Table 6 
Number of defendants in a four-year period in select Wisconsin counties 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Business/organization 
defendants 
 
Individual defendants 
 
Total 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager 
(D) 
 
22 
 
5 
 
27 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
28 
 
19 
 
47 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen 
(R) 
 
10177 
 
13178 
 
23179 
Total 60 37 97 
*Note: Counties included in this study include: Brown, Crawford, Dane, Kenosha, Marinette, Milwaukee, 
Outagamie, Racine, Vilas, Waukesha, Winnebago, and Wood. 
 
                                               
177 Dane County case 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. Four business were added to the DOJ’s 
complaint, 2014CXF-I. Because these were filed after December 2014, they are not included in this study. 
178 Dane County Case 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. Three individuals were added to the DOJ’s 
complaint, 2014CXC-E. Because these individuals were filed after December 2014, they are not included in this 
study. 
179 Dane County Case 2014CX53 was amended on October 16, 2015. The amended complaint added 2014CX53C-
I, bringing total number of defendants to 30. The additions of these seven defendants were filed after December 
2014, and are not included in this study. 
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During the first term, Doyle (D)/Lautenschlager (D), there were 27 defendants identified. 
Forty-seven defendants were identified in the second term, Doyle (D)/Van Hollen (R). Twenty-
three defendants were identified in the third term, Walker (R)/Van Hollen (R). I was able to 
code for 64% of the defendants identified during the all-Democratic term, 82% of the defendants 
from the mixed term and 88% of the defendants from the all-Republican term. I was able to code 
for a higher percentage of defendants during the mixed and all-Republican terms because there 
were fewer cases files to code for during those terms. Additionally, over the years cases filed 
become concentrated to Dane and Milwaukee counties because the majority of the cases filed in 
the second two terms studied were located in an included county. 
 In regard to H1, the data only supports the first half of H1. There is a clear decline of 
cases filed as elected officials shift from all-Democratic to all-Republican. But the number of 
defendants doesn’t show the same decline. There is, however, a significant reduction in 
defendants from the all-Democratic and mixed four-year terms to the all-Republican term. 
There were 42 total defendants during the Doyle/Lautenschlager term and 57 defendants during 
the Doyle/Van Hollen term to 26 defendants during the Walker/Van Hollen term (see Table 5). 
The data suggest that when there is a Democratic governor and attorney general in office, more 
instances of deceptive advertising will be prosecuted than when Republican governor and 
attorney general are in office.  
 It is interesting to note that during Governor Doyle’s terms the number of business 
defendants didn’t change much despite the change in party affiliation of the attorney general (see 
Table 5). The number of business defendants during Walker’s first term was nearly three times 
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smaller than the number of business defendants during Doyle’s terms. This finding again 
suggests that Republicans may be more business friendly than Democrats. 
 While the number of business defendants decreases under a Republican governor, the 
number of individual defendants prosecuted over the three terms is less clear. During the 
Doyle/Lautenschlager term, seven individual defendants were prosecuted for deceptive 
advertising. During the mixed term of Doyle/Van Hollen the number of individual defendants 
rose from seven to 24. During the all-Republican term of Walker/Van Hollen the number of 
individual defendants fell from 24 to 14, still higher than Doyle/Lautenschlager. In reality, the 
change from civil cases to complex forfeiture cases can account for some of the inconsistencies in 
the numbers for both business and individual defendants.     
 While there are more individual defendants named and prosecuted in the mixed four-
year term than in the all-Democratic term, it should again be noted that before 2007, the 
Department of Justice did not separate out and formally prosecute individuals in deceptive 
advertising cases. Thus, it is not out of the realm of possibility that had the Department of 
Justice named all individuals in a case, that there would be more individuals prosecuted in the 
all-Democratic term than in a mixed or all-Republican term. Overall, the data supports the first 
part of H1; more instances of deceptive advertising are prosecuted when there is an all-
Democratic term in place compared to a mixed term or an all-Republican term. The second half 
of H1 is inconclusive. It appears that more individuals were prosecuted for deceptive advertising 
in the mixed Doyle (D)/Van Hollen (R) term. But because of the change in Department of 
Justice administrative processes, I cannot say without reasonable doubt that had the 42 
complaints filed and prosecuted from 2003 through December 2006, been coded for all 
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individuals that there wouldn’t be more individuals prosecuted in the all-Democratic four-year 
term than in the mixed four-year term. 
 
B. Hypothesis 2 Findings 
 My second hypothesis proposed that fines would be larger under an all-Democratic term. 
I coded each case for fines, restitution and total forfeiture per case and individual defendant. The 
first four-year term analyzed, Democrats Doyle/Lautenschlager, came in with a median fine per 
case of $6,175 (see Table 7). This figure is significantly lower than the mixed four-year term of 
Doyle/Van Hollen and the all-Republican four-year term of Walker/Van Hollen, of $50,000 for 
both the mixed and the all-Republican terms. 
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Table 7 
Median fines per case 
 
Elected officials  
 
 
Number of cases fined 
 
Median fine 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
26 
 
$6,175 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
15 
 
$50,000 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
9 
 
$50,000180 
Total 50 $106,175 
*Note: The penalties were calculated according to the elected officials in office at the file date of the case, the 
conclusion. 
**Note: The numbers in this table are based off the 56 cases coded for. 
   
  The median fines per individual charged in a deceptive advertising case. Regarding fines 
per individual, the all-Democratic term, Doyle/Lautenschlager, and the mixed term, Doyle/Van 
Hollen, came in significantly lower than the all-Republican term, Walker /Van Hollen. The 
defendants issued with a fine during the Doyle/Lautenschlager term had a median fine of $6,175 
per individual charged in the case. Admittedly, this figure may be high per individual because not 
all individuals in a case were named before 2007. Individual defendants issued with fines under 
the Doyle/ Van Hollen term were issued with a median fine of $4,762. During the Walker /Van 
                                               
180 Waukesha County cases 2012CX01, 2012CX01A, 2012CX01B, and 2012CX01C each have $150,948.71 
attached to them as part of a settlement with the 2010 Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
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Hollen term, individual defendants charged with violating the deceptive advertising statute had a 
median fine of $40,000 (see Table 8). 
Table 8 
Median fines per individual charged in a case 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of individuals charged 
with fines 
 
Median fine 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
26 
 
$6,175 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
39 
 
$4,762 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
13 
 
$34,638181 
Total  78 $45,575 
*Note: The penalties were calculated according to the governor and attorney general in office at the filing date of the 
cases, not the conclusion of the case. There were 26 individuals charged with fines in term 1. 
**Note: The numbers in this table are based off the 56 cases coded for. 
 
 Restitution orders under the all-Democrat four-year term were also significantly lower 
than the other two terms. The Doyle/Lautenschlager term had a median restitution order of 
$1,768. The Doyle/Van Hollen term increased the median restitution order to $71,800. Finally, 
the Walker/Van Hollen term drastically increased the median restitution order to $228,800 (see 
Table 9). The Department of Justice cannot always determine the full amount of restitution 
                                               
181 Waukesha County case 2012CX01has $603,794.84 attached to it as part of a settlement with the 2010 
Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
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received by Wisconsin consumers because some settlement recoveries are distributed by third 
parties.182  
Table 9 
Median restitution per case  
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of cases ordered 
restitution 
 
Median restitution 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
7 
 
$1,768 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
11 
 
$71,800 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
7 
 
$228,800183 
Total 25 $302,368 
 
 Table 10 demonstrates the median restitution ordered per individual prosecuted in a 
deceptive advertising case. Again, the amount of restitution ordered per individual defendant is 
significantly higher under the mixed four-year term of Doyle/Van Hollen and under the all-
Republican four-year term of Walker/Van Hollen than during the all-Democratic four-year 
term. The median amount of restitution ordered per individual charged during the Doyle/Van 
Hollen term is over ten times the amount of restitution ordered under the Doyle/ Lautenschlager 
term. The all-Republican term ordered a median restitution over 150 times the restitution of the 
all-Democratic term. The all-Democratic four-year term had a median of $1,768 in restitution 
                                               
182 Pollek, supra note 91. 
183 Waukesha County cases 2012CX01, 2012CX01A, 2012CX01B, and 2012CX01C each have $542,857.14 
attached to them as part of a settlement with the 2010 Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
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ordered per individual defendant. The median restitution ordered per individual defendant 
during the mixed four-year term was $23,933. The all-Republican term had the highest median 
restitution ordered per individual defendant at $287,289. These figures, however, are not entirely 
accurate due to the use of third parties used to distribute some of the forfeiture recoveries. 
Additionally, many times a lump some forfeiture is ordered by the court and documented as 
penalties, fees and restitution without identifying how much of the total forfeiture is 
restitution.184 
Table 10 
Median restitution per individual charged in a case 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of individuals charged 
with restitution 
 
Median restitution charged per 
individual 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
7 
 
$1,768 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
28 
 
$23,933 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
10 
 
$287,289185 
Total 45 $312,988 
  
 Finally, I coded for total amount of forfeitures. The total amount of forfeitures is perhaps 
the best measure of financial penalties because it includes fines, fees and restitution. Often, 
                                               
184 Pollek, supra note 91. 
185 Waukesha County case 2012CX01 has $2,171,428.56 attached to it as part of a settlement with the 2010 
Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
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restitution is included in the lump sum of forfeitures indicated in court documents without 
specifying exactly how much the restitution would be. The Doyle/Lautenschlager term had 
median total forfeitures of $7,031. Again, the all-Democratic term issued fewer fines, fees and 
restitution than the other two four-year terms. The Doyle/Van Hollen term had median total 
forfeitures of $105,745. The all-Republican term of Walker/Van Hollen had the largest median 
total forfeitures of $316,900. Table 11 shows the total amount of forfeitures per case under each 
of the four-year terms.  
Table 11 
Total median forfeitures per case 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of cases ordered 
forfeitures 
 
Total median forfeiture 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
26 
 
$7,031 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
15 
 
$105,745 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
10 
 
$316,900186 
Total 51 $429,676 
 
 The total median forfeiture per individual charged in a case was coded for as well (see 
Table 12). Again, because during the Doyle/Lautenschlager four-year term, individual defendants 
                                               
186 Waukesha County cases 2012CX01, 2012CX01A, 2012CX01B, and 2012CX01C each have $542,857.14 
attached to them as part of a settlement with the 2010 Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
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were not indicated the median total forfeiture per individual charged in a case remains the same as 
the total medial forfeiture per case, $7,031. Under the Doyle/Van Hollen four-year term the 
median total forfeiture per individual charged in a case increase over two times the amount of the 
previous term to $14,536. Finally, a very significant hike in the total median forfeiture per 
individual charged in a case was seen under the Walker/Van Hollen four-year term of $293,800. 
Table 12 
Total median forfeitures per individual charged in a case 
 
Governor/attorney general 
 
 
Number of individuals charged 
with a forfeiture 
 
Total median forfeiture 
 
Doyle (D) / Lautenschlager (D) 
 
 
26 
 
$7,031 
 
Doyle (D) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
40 
 
$14,536 
 
Walker (R) / Van Hollen (R) 
 
 
13 
 
$293,800187 
Total 79 $315,367 
 H2 is unsupported by the data. As the number of cases and individual defendants goes 
down in the consecutive four-year terms, the amount of total forfeitures, fines and restitution 
goes up significantly. 
 
 
                                               
187 Waukesha County case 2012CX01 has $2,171,428.56 attached to it as part of a settlement with the 2010 
Outagamie Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
  
 
55 
C. Hypothesis 3 Findings 
  H3 states that an all-Democratic term will have a higher percentage of guilty outcomes 
of cases and individuals in comparison to a mixed term or the all-Republican term. Cases were 
coded for the outcomes of cases and individuals according to the governor and attorney general 
in office at the start of the trial and according to the outcomes of cases and individuals according 
to the governor and attorney general in office at the close of the case. Some, but not all cases 
conclude after a change in governor and attorney general. Cases and individuals were coded for 
settlements before and after court proceedings, dismissal of a case and or individual(s), guilty plea 
entered, went to trial and found guilty, and went to trial and found innocent. 
 The mixed term, Doyle/Van Hollen, had the highest percentage of guilty outcomes with 
52.9% of all cases pleading guilty and 17.6% of all cases being found guilty at trial (see Table 
13.1). The total guilty outcome for cases filed in 2007-2010 during the mixed term is 70.5%. 
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Table 13.1 
Outcome of all 79 cases, governor and AG in office at filing of case and percentage of guilty outcomes 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
 
Settlement 
 
Case 
dismissed 
 
Guilty plea 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Total guilty 
outcomes 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
 
25 (59.5%) 
 
1 (2.3%) 
 
13 (31%) 
 
3 (7.1%) 
 
16 (38%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
 
6 (26%) 
 
3 (13%) 
 
10 (43.5%) 
 
4 (17.4%) 
 
14 (60.9%) 
 
Walker/ Van Hollen 
 
 
11 (78.5%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (7%) 
 
1 (7%) 
 
2 (14.3%) 
Total 42 (53%) 4 (5%) 24 (30%) 8 (10%) 32 (40.5%) 
*Note: One case is missing from the Walker/Van Hollen term because it is still open 
**Note: Settlement refers both to cases settled before or after a trial started. 
  
 The all-Democratic term had the second highest guilty outcomes. Of the cases filed in 
the all-Democratic term, 37% of all cases plead guilty, and 11.1% of the cases were found guilty 
at trial. The total guilty outcome for the all-Democratic term was 48.1%.  
 The all-Republican term had the fewest number of cases ending in a guilty verdict. Not a 
single case was entered in as a guilty plea, and only one case or 11.1% of all cases filed in 2011-
4014 were found guilty at trial. 
 Settlements were reached at a higher rate for the all-Republican term. The Walker and 
Van Hollen term had the highest settlement rate, 88.9% of all cases filed in 2011-2014 ended in 
a settlement. Settlements could have occurred before trial proceedings or after a trial began. The 
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all-Democratic term, Doyle/Lautenschlager had the second highest settlement rate of 48.1%. 
The mixed term, Doyle/Van Hollen had the lowest   
 Settlements and pleading guilty outcomes both stay out of a court room and have 
forfeitures ordered by the court. Additionally, while agreeing to a settlement that results in a 
monetary forfeiture isn’t an admission of guilt, it does suggest that the defendant isn’t sure that 
court proceedings would result in a not guilty verdict. For these reasons, I opted to combine cases 
that ended in a settlement with cases that plead guilty. Even when combining the cases that 
ended in a settlement with cases that plead guilty, the all-Republican term has the highest 
settlement rate at 88.9%. The all-Democratic term has a much higher settlement rate of 85.2% 
when combined with guilty pleas. Finally, the mixed term soars to a 70.6% settlement rate when 
settlements are combined with guilty pleas (see Table 13.2). 
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Table 13.2 
Outcome of all 79 cases, Gov. and AG in office at filing of case & total percent charged with forfeitures  
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement/Guilty 
plea 
 
Case dismissed 
 
Trial found guilty 
 
Total cases 
charged with a 
forfeiture 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
 
38 (80%) 
 
1 (2.3%) 
 
3 (7.1%) 
 
41 (97.6%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
 
16 (69.5%) 
 
3 (13%) 
 
4 (17.4%) 
 
20 (87%) 
 
Walker/ Van Hollen 
 
 
12 (85.7%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (7%) 
 
13 (92.8%) 
Total 66 (83.5%) 4 (5%) 8 (10%) 74 (93.6%) 
*Note: One case is missing from the Walker/Van Hollen term because the case is still open. 
**Settlement refers to both cases settled before or after a trial has started and is combined with guilty pleas. 
  
 Having a case dismissed once charges had been filed was unlikely no matter which 
political party was in charge. The all-Democratic term dismissed one or 3.7% of all cases filed 
during the 2003-2006 term. The mixed term dismissed two or 11.8% of all cases filed in 2007-
2010. The all-Republican term did not dismiss any cases filed in 2011-2014.  
 The picture isn’t much different for the all-Democratic four-year term and the mixed 
term concerning outcomes of a case when the cases are coded for by the elected officials in office 
at the close of the case (see Table 14.1). Coding the cases for outcomes by according to the 
elected officials in office at the close of the case boosts the guilty rate for the all-Republican four-
year term significantly. During the Walker/Van Hollen four-year term guilty rate increases to 
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40% when cases filed during the mixed four-year term but were concluded in the all-Republican 
term are included in the guilty count. The total guilty verdict for the all-Republican four-year 
term is 50%. 
Table 14.1 
Outcome of the 56 cases, governor and AG in office at close of case and percentage guilty 
 
Governor/attorney 
general  
 
Settlement 
 
Case 
dismissed 
 
Guilty Plea 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Total guilty 
outcomes 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
11 (50%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
9 (41%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
10 (45.5%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
4 (23.5%) 
 
2 (11.8%) 
 
9 (52.9%) 
 
2 (11.8%) 
 
11 (64.7%) 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
5 (50%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (10%) 
 
4 (40%) 
 
5 (50%) 
Total 20 (35.7%) 3 (5.4%) 19 (34%) 7 (12.5%) 26 (46.4%) 
*Note: Seven cases are not included in this table because their outcome came after December 31, 2014. 
   
 The mixed four-year term still has the highest guilty outcome with 52.9% of cases ending 
in a guilty plea and 11.8% of cases found guilty at trial. Of all the cases concluded during the 
mixed term, 64.7% ended in a guilty plea or guilty verdict at trial.  
 Guilty pleas during the all-Democratic four-year term increased to 41% when the cases 
were coded for outcomes according to the elected officials in office at the close of the case. But 
the guilty at trial verdict fell to 4.5% during the all-Democratic four-year term. The all-
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Democratic four-year term had a 45.5% guilty rate total when cases were filed and closed during 
the Doyle/Lautenschlager four-year term (see Table 14.1). 
 The settlement rate for both the four-year all-Democratic term and the all-Republican 
term when coded for outcomes based on the governor and attorney general in office at the close 
of the case is 50%. The mixed four-year term, Doyle/Van Hollen had a 23.5% settlement rate. 
When combining settlements with guilty pleas for cases coded by outcome and the governor and 
attorney general in office at the end of the case, the all-Democratic term has the highest 
settlement rate at 91% (see Table 14.2).  
Table 14.2 
Outcome of 56 cases, governor and AG in office at close of case and percentage charged with forfeiture 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement/Guilty 
plea 
 
Case dismissed 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Cases charged 
with a forfeiture 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
20 (91%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
21 (95.5%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
13 (76.5%) 
 
2 (11.8%) 
 
2 (11.8%) 
 
15 (83.3%) 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
6 (60%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
4 (40%) 
 
10 (100%) 
Total 39 (69.6%) 3 (5.3%) 7 (12.5%) 46 (82%) 
*Note: Seven cases are not included in this table because their outcome came after December 31, 2014. 
**Note: Settlement in this table refers to both settlements reached before and after a trial started is combined with 
guilty pleas entered. 
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 The mixed four-year term, Doyle/Van Hollen, had a settlement rate of 76.5% and the 
all-Republican four-year term had 60% of cases end in a settlement or guilty plea. 
 Tables 15.1-16.2 show the outcomes for individuals charged in deceptive advertising 
cases. Table 15.1 shows the outcomes of defendants coded by the governor and attorney general 
in office at the time the case was filed. The mixed term had the highest guilty findings, 19.1% of 
individuals charged during the Doyle/Van Hollen four-year term were found guilty at trial, and 
42.6% of individuals plead guilty, in total, 61.7% of individuals charged with deceptive 
advertising from 2007-2010 were guilty. 
Table 15.1 
Outcome of defendants, governor and AG at filing of case, and percentage guilty 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement 
 
Defendant 
dismissed 
 
Guilty Plea 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Total guilty 
outcomes 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
13 (48.1%) 
 
1 (3.7%) 
 
10 (37%) 
 
3 (11.1%) 
 
13 (48%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
11 (23.4%) 
 
7 (14.9%) 
 
20 (42.6%) 
 
9 (19.1%) 
 
29 (61.7%) 
 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
16 (69.6%) 
 
5 (21.7%) 
 
0 (0%) 
 
1 (4.3%) 
 
1 (4.3%) 
Total 40 (41.2%) 13 (13.4%) 30 (31%) 13 (13.4%) 43 (44.3%) 
*Note: Settlement refers to cases settled both before and after a trial has started. 
*Note: One defendant is missing from the Walker/Van Hollen term because the case is still open. 
  
 The all-Democratic term had the second highest guilty findings, with 11.1% of 
individuals found guilty at trial and 37% plead guilty. Nearly half of individuals charged with 
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deceptive advertising in the all-Democratic term were found guilty. The all-Republican term had 
one individual found guilty at trial, making the guilty rate for the Walker/Van Hollen term 6.7%. 
The all-Republican term did not have any individuals plead guilty. The mixed four-year term 
also had the highest rate of individuals dismissed from a case at 14.9%. The all-Republican term 
dismissed 21.7% of individuals charged with deceptive advertising and the all-Democratic four-
year term dismissed just one, or 3.7% of individuals. The all-Republican four-year term had the 
highest settlement rate for individuals, at 69.6%. The all-Democratic four-year term had a 
settlement rate of 48.1%, and the mixed term had a settlement rate of 23.4% for individuals. 
When guilty pleas are combined with settlements, the all-Democratic term has the highest 
settlement rate at 85.2%, and the mixed term’s settlement rate goes up to 65.9%. The all-
Republican term’s settlement rate stayed the same when combining the guilty pleas with the 
settlements rates of individuals (see Table 15.2). 
 In terms of wins for the state, the all-Democratic term has the highest winning rate at 
96.3% of individuals charged with deceptive advertising being charged with a monetary 
forfeiture. Roughly 85% of individuals charged with deceptive advertising during the mixed term 
ended up being charged with a monetary forfeiture. Finally, 74% of individuals charged with 
deceptive advertising during the all-Republican term were charged with a monetary forfeiture.  
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Table 15.2 
Outcome of defendants, governor and AG at filing of case, and percentage charged with forfeiture 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement/guilty 
plea 
 
Defendant 
dismissed 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Individuals 
charged with 
forfeiture 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
23 (85.2%) 
 
1 (3.7%) 
 
3 (11.1%) 
 
26 (96.3%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
31 (65.9%) 
 
7 (14.9%) 
 
9 (19.1%) 
 
40 (85.1%) 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
16 (69.6%) 
 
5 (21.7%) 
 
1 (6.7%) 
 
17 (74%) 
Total 70 (72.1%) 13 (13.4%) 13 (13.4%) 83 (85.6%) 
*Note: Settlement refers to cases settled both before and after a trial has started and defendants that plead guilty. 
**Note: One defendant is missing from the Walker/Van Hollen term because the case is still open. 
  
 Table 16.1 shows the outcomes for individuals based on the governor and attorney 
general in office at the conclusion of the case. When looking at the data this way, the mixed 
four-year term still has the highest total guilty rate of individuals, guilty pleas (57%) and guilty at 
trial (5.7%) combined for 62.7%. The all-Republican had the second highest totally guilty rate at 
47.8% but had the highest guilty at trial rate of 43.5%, and 4.3% of individuals plead guilty. The 
all-Democratic four-year term had a total guilty rate of 45.5%, 41% of individuals plead guilty 
and 4.5% were found guilty at trial.  
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Table 16.1 
Outcomes of defendants, governor and AG in office at the close of the case, and percentage guilty 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement 
 
Defendant 
dismissed 
 
Guilty Plea 
 
Trial found 
guilty 
 
Total guilty 
outcomes 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
11 (50%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
9 (41%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
10 (45.5%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
8 (22.9%) 
 
5 (14.3%) 
 
20 (57%) 
 
2 (5.7%) 
 
22 (62.9%) 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
10 (43.5%) 
 
2 (8.7%) 
 
1 (4.3%) 
 
10 (43.5%) 
 
11 (48%) 
Total 29 (30%) 8 (8.2%) 30 (31%) 13 (13.4%) 43 (44.3%) 
*Note: Seventeen defendants are not included in this table because their outcome came after December 31, 2014. 
**Note: Settlement refers to cases settled both before and after a trial has started. 
 
 The all-Democratic four-year term, Doyle/Lautneschlater, had the highest settlement 
rate for individuals at 50%. The all-Republican four-year term, Walker/Van Hollen, had the 
second highest settlement rate of 43.5% for individuals, and the mixed four-year term and an 
individual settlement rate of 22.9%. The mixed term had the highest percentage of individuals 
dismissed from a case, 14.3%. The all-Republican term dismissed 8.7% of individuals from cases, 
and the all-Democratic term dismissed 4.5% of individuals from cases. Table 16.2 combines 
individuals who plead guilty with individuals who took settlements. The all-Democratic term 
had 91% of individuals take a settlement or plead guilty. The mixed term had 80% of individuals 
plead guilty or take a settlement and the all-Republican term had 47.8% of individuals take a 
settlement or plead guilty. 
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Table 16.2 
Outcomes of defendants, Gov. & AG in office at the close of case, & percentage charged with forfeiture 
 
Governor/attorney 
general 
 
Settlement 
 
Defendant 
dismissed 
 
Trial found guilty 
 
Individuals 
charged with 
forfeiture 
 
Doyle/Lautenschlager 
 
20 (91%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
1 (4.5%) 
 
21 (95.5%) 
 
Doyle/Van Hollen 
 
28 (80%) 
 
5 (14.3%) 
 
2 (5.7%) 
 
30 (86%) 
 
Walker /Van Hollen 
 
11 (47.8%) 
 
2 (8.7%) 
 
10 (43.5%) 
 
21 (91.3%) 
Total 59 (61%) 8 (8.2%) 
 
13 (13.4%) 
 
72 (74.2%) 
*Note: Seventeen defendants are not included in this table because their outcome came after December 31, 2014. 
**Note: Settlement in this table refers to both settlements reached before a trial started as well as settlements 
reached during a trial. 
  
 These findings are based on the 56 cases I was able to code for out of the 79 cases I 
identified. I coded 64.3% of the cases identified as filed in the all-Democratic term of 
Doyle/Lautenschlager. For the Dolye /Van Hollen mixed term, I was able to code for 74% of the 
cases identified as filed during their term. Finally, I was able to code for 86% of the cases 
identified as filed in the all-Republican term of Walker/Van Hollen. 
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II.   Other Coding Results 
 I was able to code for 56 cases with 97 individual defendants. Much of what I coded was 
done for the purpose of testing my hypotheses. However, I was able to code additional variables 
somewhat unrelated to my hypotheses. This section deals with those notable findings. 
 
A.  Outcome of Case and Prosecuting Assistant Attorney General 
 
 Table 17 shows the outcomes of cases based on who the prosecuting assistant attorney 
general (AAG) was. Of the 56 cases coded, only 7 (13%) went to trial.188  One hundred percent 
of the coded cases that went to trial resulted in a guilty verdict; AAG John Green is most likely 
to take a case to trial. Assistant attorneys general Nelle Rohlich and Lara Sutherlin prosecuted 
the most cases coded, 26.7% and 21.4% respectively. Sutherlin is more likely to reach a 
settlement than Rohlich, but Rohlich is more likely to dismiss a case entirely or reach a guilty 
plea. Table 18 shows the outcomes of individuals based on who the prosecuting AAG was. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
188 There is a possiblity that 8 of the 56 cases coded for will go to trial, as one of Sutherlin's case is still open . 
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Table 17 
Outcome of case and prosecuting assistant attorney general 
 
AAG 
 
Settlement Case dismissed Guilty plea Trial found guilty 
Beilin, Lewis W. 1 (100%) 0 0 0 
Earley, Meredith 
M. 
1 (25%) 0 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 
Ferris, Philip D. 2 (100%) 0 0 0 
Gilles, David J. 2 (66.7%) 0 0 1 (33.3%) 
Green, John S. 3 (50%) 0 1 (16.7%) 2 (33.3%) 
Hancock, Jerry L. 1 (100%) 0 0 0 
Hirsch, Cynthia 
Rae 
0 1 (33.3%) 2 (66.7%) 0 
Jefferies, James D. 4 (66.7%) 0 2 (33.3%) 0 
Milligan, Diane L. 1(100%) 0 0 0 
Rohlich, Nelle 3 (20%) 2 (13.3%) 9 (60%) 1 (6.7%) 
Sutherlin, Lara* 7 (63.6%) 0 3 (27.3%) 1 (9.1%) 
Joint 1 (50%) 0 0 1 (50%) 
 
Totals** 
 
26 (47.3%) 
 
3 (5.5%) 
 
19 (34.5%) 
 
7 (12.7%) 
*Note: One of Sutherlin’s cases is still open. 
**Note: Totals do not include the open case. 
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Table 18 
Outcome of defendants and prosecuting assistant attorney general 
 
AAG 
 
Settlement Defendant dismissed Guilty plea Trial found guilty 
Beilin, Lewis W. 2 (100%) 0 0 0 
Earley, Meredith 
M. 
1 (25%) 0 2 (50%) 1 (25%) 
Ferris, Philip D. 4 (100%) 0 0 0 
Gilles, David J. 2 (66.7%) 0 0 1 (33.3%) 
Green, John S. 5 (62.5%) 0 1 (12.5%) 2 (25%) 
Hancock, Jerry L. 1 (100%) 0 0 0 
Hirsch, Cynthia 
Rae 
0 1 (16.7%) 5 (83.3%) 0 
Jefferies, James D. 4 (66.7%) 0 2 (33.3%) 0 
Milligan, Diane L. 1(100%) 0 0 0 
Rohlich, Nelle 3 (18.8%) 2 (12.5%) 10 (62.5%) 1 (6.2%) 
Sutherlin, Lara* 13 (40.6%) 8 (25%) 10 (31.3%) 1 (3.1%) 
Joint 4 (30.8%) 2 (15.4%) 0  7 (53.8%) 
 
Totals** 
 
40 (41%) 
 
13 (14%) 
 
30 (31%) 
 
13 (14%) 
*Note: One Sutherlin defendant is still in pre-trial negotiations. 
**Note: Totals do not include the open trials. 
 
 Individuals prosecuted for deceptive advertising are more likely to have their case end in a 
settlement (41%). Only 14% of all defendants were dismissed of charges, however, 3 defendants 
were dismissed with prejudice.189 Forty-five percent of all individual defendants entered in a 
guilty plea.  
 
                                               
189 Three of Sutherlin's defendants were dismissed with prejudice in association with the settled Dane County case 
2013CX11, Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC. 
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B.  Type of Defendant 
 Table 19 is a breakdown of the types of defendants prosecuted for deceptive advertising. 
Businesses were the most prevalent type of defendant identified in the 56 coded cases, which is 
unsurprising. What is somewhat curious is that in terms of gender, men were named as 
individual defendants nearly four times as often as women. Nonprofits were coded for, but it 
should be noted that the two nonprofits prosecuted for deceptive advertising, were found not to 
be legitimate nonprofit organizations.190 
Table 19 
Type of defendant  
 
Type of defendant 
 
Frequency Percent 
Male 31 32% 
Female 8 8.2% 
Business 56 57.7% 
Nonprofit 2 2.1% 
Total 97 100% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
190 The “so-called nonprofits” were from the Dane County case, 2007CX21; defendants F & G, The Journal of 
American Medicine and Health Care and American Medical Enterprise Association. 
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C.  County of Circuit Court Filings 
 
 Of the 72 Wisconsin counties, only 23 have filed deceptive advertising cases from 2003 
through 2014. Table 20, shows the frequency of filings of alleged deceptive advertising cases for 
all 79 cases. For all of the 79 cases identified, Dane County had the most filings (29) 36.7% of all 
cases identified in this study. Milwaukee County had the second most filings of all counties with 
13 filings or 16.4% of all cases identified in this study. Kenosha and Waukesha counties each 
filed 5% of all the cases identified in this study.  
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Table 20 
County complaint/case filed in for all counties 
 
County 
 
Frequency Percent 
Brown 1 1.3% 
Columbia 1 1.3% 
Crawford 1 1.3% 
Dane 28 35.4% 
Eau Claire 1 1.3% 
Fond du Lac 1 1.3% 
Kenosha 4 5% 
Marathon 1 1.3% 
Marinette 2 2.5% 
Milwaukee 13 16.4% 
Oneida 1 1.3% 
Outagamie 2 2.5% 
Ozaukee 4 5% 
Portage 3 3.8% 
Racine 3 3.8% 
Rock 1 1.3% 
Sheboygan 1 1.3% 
St. Croix 1 1.3% 
Vilas 1 1.3% 
Walworth 1 1.3% 
Waukesha 4 5% 
Winnebago 2 2.5% 
Wood 2 2.5% 
 
Total 
 
79 
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 Table 21 shows the frequency and percentage of cases filed in the selected Wisconsin 
counties for this study. Dane and Milwaukee counties were included in this study because over 
50% of the cases identified were filed in those two counties (see Table 20).  
 Of the 56 cases coded for this study, 28 or 50% of the cases were filed in Dane County.191 
Twelve of the 56 cases or 21.4% were filed in Milwaukee County (see Table 21). The other 10 
counties were chosen for this study because of their location to Milwaukee County and or 
because the information needed for coding was available online or in other government 
documents. In total, I was able to code 70.8% of all the cases identified from 2003-2014. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
191 Dane, Milwaukee, Outagamie, and Wood Counties are missing a case(s) in the final analysis because the case 
files were unavailable during my visits to the court houses or the information was not recoded entirely in the 
Consumer Protection Programs Informational Papers. 
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Table 21 
County complaint/case filed in select counties 
 
County 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Brown 1 1.8% 
Crawford 1 1.8% 
Dane 28 50% 
Kenosha 1 1.8% 
Marinette 1 1.8% 
Milwaukee 12 21.4% 
Outagamie 1 1.8% 
Racine 3 5.4% 
Vilas 1 1.3% 
Waukesha 4 7.1% 
Winnebago 2 3.6% 
Wood 1 1.8% 
Total 56  
*Note: Some counties are missing cases because I was unable to get access to all case files. 
 
D. Outcomes Coded by Defense Attorney Request to Withdraw 
 Tables 22.1-23.2 show the outcomes of cases and defendants based on whether or not an 
attorney requested to be withdrawn from the case. Of the 56 cases coded for, 42.9% of the cases 
did not have legal representation. Cases that were not represented by an attorney were much 
more likely to reach a settlement rather than go to trial. When settlements and guilty pleas are 
coded for separately, 54.2% of unrepresented cases ended in a settlement and 37.5% of these 
cases entered a guilty plea (see Table 22.1).  
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Table 22.1 
Outcomes of cases and defense attorney request to withdraw 
Defense attorney 
request to 
withdraw from 
case  
 
Settlement 
 
Case dismissed 
 
Guilty plea 
 
Trial found guilty 
No request to 
withdraw 
7 (35%) 1 (5%) 8 (40%) 4 (20%) 
Request to 
withdraw 
5 (50%) 0 (0%) 2 (20%) 3 (30%) 
No attorney 13 (54.2%) 2 (8.3%) 9 (37.5%) 0 (0%) 
*Note: One case is still open and the attorney has not requested to withdraw. 
 
 When settlement and guilty pleas are combined, 91.7% of cases without legal 
representation ended in a settlement (see Table 22.2). Not a single case without legal 
representation went to trial. Once the Wisconsin Department of Justice has filed a case is 
unlikely that the case will be dismissed. Two (8.3%) of the three of the 56 cases coded were 
dismissed and lacked legal representation. Five percent of the cases dismissed had legal 
representation that did not seek to withdraw from the case. 
Table 22.2 
Outcomes of cases and defense attorney requests to withdraw combining settlements and guilty pleas 
Defense attorney 
request to withdraw 
from case  
 
Settlement/guilty plea 
 
Case dismissed 
 
Trial found guilty 
No request to withdraw 15 (75%) 1 (5%) 4 (20%) 
Request to withdraw 7 (70%) 0 (0%) 3 (30%) 
No attorney 22 (91.7%) 2 (8.3%) 0 (0%) 
*Note: Three cases are still open and have not had an attorney request to withdraw from the case. 
**Note: Settlement includes guilty pleas. 
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 Of the 56 cases coded for, 10 or 17.9% of the cases had an attorney request to be 
withdrawn from the case. Not a single case that had an attorney request to withdraw ended in 
the case being dismissed. Settlements were most common for cases that had an attorney request 
to be withdrawn at 70%. Cases whose attorney requested to withdraw from the case and went to 
trial ended in a guilty verdict at a rate of 30%. Only 20% of cases whose attorney request to 
withdraw ended with a guilty plea (see Table 22.1). When settlements and guilty pleas are 
combined, 70% of cases whose attorney requested to withdraw ended in a settlement (see Table 
22.2). Settlements and guilty pleas are a win for the state, defendants are charged with forfeitures 
and the state doesn’t have to spend time in litigation. 
 For the 20 or 35.7% of cases that did not have an attorney request to withdraw from the 
case, settlement was the most common outcome (see Table 22.1). The settlement rate for these 
cases was 35%. Only 5% of cases whose legal representation did not request to be removed from 
the case ended in the case’s dismissal. Forty percent of cases whose attorney did not request to 
withdraw ended in a guilty plea and 20% of these cases went to trial and were found guilty. 
When settlement and guilty plea are combined, 75% of cases whose attorney did not request to 
withdraw from the case ended in a settlement (see Table 22.2). 
 Around 2007, not only were all alleged violations of deceptive advertising being filed as 
complex forfeiture cases, but all entities (multiple individuals and or multiple organizations) 
being charged in a case were specifically called out and given a “related” case number. For 
example, if a Dane County case had multiple defendants the case would be given a number-2007 
(the year) CX (complex forfeiture) 9 (the ninth complex forfeiture case filed in 2007 in Dane 
County) 2007-CX-9. Any additional individual or organization accused of being part of the 
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alleged deceptive advertising violation would have the same case number, 2007-CX-9 but a letter 
would be attached to the “9”, 2007-CX-9A and so on for as many entities that allegedly were 
party to the deceptive advertising violation. The complex filing of these cases and individuals 
makes it possible to dismiss an individual or organization but not the case. Additionally, it allows 
individuals the opportunity to have their own legal counsel if they so choose.192 Tables 23.1-23.2 
look at the outcomes of individuals and whether or not their legal counsel requested to withdraw 
from the case or not. 
 At the individual level, 29 or 29.9% (a total of 97 defendants coded for) had their 
attorney request to be withdrawn from their case. Individual defendants whose attorney request 
to withdraw were more likely to see their case end in a settlement (see Table 23.1). Fifteen 
(51.7%) of individuals, whose attorney withdrew, saw their case end in a settlement. Two of 
these individuals (6.9%) were successfully dismissed from the case. Three individuals whose 
attorney requested to be withdrawn entered a guilty plea, and 9 (31%) of these individuals went 
to trial and were found guilty. When settlements and guilty pleas were combined, 57.7% of 
individuals whose attorney requested to withdraw saw their case end in a settlement (see Table 
23.2). 
 
 
 
                                               
192 Telephone Interview with Lara Sutherlin, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, supra 
note 172. 
  
 
77 
Table 23.1 
Outcomes of defendants and defense attorney request to withdraw 
Defense attorney 
request to 
withdraw from 
case  
 
Settlement 
 
Defendant 
dismissed 
 
Guilty plea 
 
Trial found guilty 
No request to 
withdraw 
10 (24.3%) 9 (22%) 18 (44%) 4 (9.7%) 
Attorney withdrew 15 (51.7%) 2 (6.9%) 3 (10.3%) 9 (31%) 
No attorney 15 (57.7%) 2 (7.7%) 9 (34.6%) 0 (0%) 
*Note: One defendant is still on trial and the attorney has not requested to withdraw from the case. 
**Note: Settlement includes guilty pleas. 
 
 Thirty-seven of the 97 total defendants did not have an attorney request to withdraw 
from their case. Of the individuals whose attorney did not request to withdraw from the case, 
24.3% ended their case in a settlement (see Table 23.1). Six of these individuals (16.2%) were 
dismissed from the case. Most individuals whose attorney did not request to withdraw from their 
case entered a guilty plea, at 44%. Finally, four or 9.7% of individuals who maintained the same 
legal counsel for the duration of the case went to trial and were found guilty. When guilty plea 
and settlement were coded together, 73% of individual’s cases ended in a settlement (see Table 
23.2). 
Table 23.2 
Outcomes of defendants and defense attorney request to withdraw combining settlement and guilty plea 
Defense attorney 
request to withdraw 
from case  
Settlement Defendant dismissed Trial found guilty 
No request to withdraw 28 (73%) 9 (16.2%) 4 (10.8%) 
Attorney withdrew 18 (57.7%) 2 (7.7%) 9 (34.6%) 
No attorney 24 (92.3%) 2 (7.7%) 0 (0%) 
*Note: Seven defendants are still on trial and have not had an attorney request to withdraw from the case. 
**Note: One defendant is still on trial and the attorney withdrew from the case. 
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 Twenty-six or 26.8% of individual defendants did not seek legal counsel. Of those 
defendants that did not obtain legal counsel, 57.7% of them reached a settlement with the 
Wisconsin Department of Justice (see Table 23.1). Nearly 8% of unrepresented defendants were 
dismissed from the case, and 34.6% of unrepresented defendants entered a guilty plea. Not a 
single unrepresented defendant took their case to trial. When settlements and guilty pleas are 
combined, 92.3% of unrepresented defendants ended their case with a settlement or guilty plea 
(see Table 23.2). 
E.  Advertising Mediums Allegedly in Violation 
 All 56 cases were also coded for the advertising medium(s) allegedly in violation of 
Wisconsin’s deceptive advertising law. Tables 24-26 show the trends of which media was used to 
allegedly transmit deceptive advertising messages during each of the three four-year terms 
examined in this study.  
 During the all-Democratic four-year term, more cases of deceptive advertising were 
prosecuted than in the mixed four-year term or during the all-Republican four-year term. Of the 
27 alleged deceptive advertising violations during the Doyle/Lautenschlager term, 10 of those 
alleged violations were phone calls to consumers (see Table 24).  
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Table 24 
Advertising medium allegedly in violation during the all-Democratic four-year term 
 
Advertising medium 
 
Frequency Percent 
Print 0 0% 
Oral 0 0% 
Envelope 1 3.7% 
Letter 1 3.7% 
Service/contract agreement 1 3.7% 
Outdoor 7 25.9% 
Telephone  10 37% 
Radio 0 0% 
Website 0 0% 
Multiple mediums 7 25.9% 
Multiple mediums including 
internet 0 0% 
Total 27 100% 
 
Seven of the alleged violations during this time were identified as outdoor advertisements, and 
seven of the alleged violations were identified as multiple medium advertising campaigns not 
including the internet. The remaining alleged violations were in the forms of letters, envelopes, 
and service or contract agreements. During the Doyle/Lautenschlager term, not a single alleged 
violation was identified in the form of internet advertising.  
 Table 25 shows the advertising mediums of the alleged deceptive advertising violations 
for the mixed, Doyle/Van Hollen term. Of the 17 alleged violations identified during this four-
year term, 29% were considered multiple medium advertising campaigns without an internet 
component.  
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Table 25 
Advertising medium allegedly in violation during the mixed four-year term 
 
Advertising medium 
 
Frequency Percent 
Print 1 6% 
Oral 0 0% 
Envelope 2 12% 
Letter 0 0% 
Service/contract agreement 0 0% 
Outdoor 0 0% 
Telephone  3 17% 
Radio 0 0% 
Website 2 12% 
Multiple mediums 5 29% 
Multiple mediums including 
internet 4 24% 
Total 17 100% 
 
 During the Doyle/Van Hollen term, was the first time advertisements over the internet 
were identified as allegedly deceptive, 24% (4) of the cases during this term were coded as 
multiple medium advertising campaigns that included an internet component and two of these 
cases were coded as websites allegedly in violation of Wisconsin’s deceptive advertising law. A 
total of 36% of the cases coded for had an internet component during the Doyle/Van Hollen 
term. Alleged telephone violations fell during this time period to three. The remaining alleged 
violations were in the form of print and envelope. 
 During the all-Republican, Walker/Van Hollen term there were 12 cases of alleged 
deceptive advertising cases. During this term, 33% (4) of the cases were coded as multiple 
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medium advertising campaigns without an internet component, and two were coded as multiple 
medium advertising campaigns with an internet component (see Table 26). During this term 
cases with an internet component dropped to 17%. Additionally, two cases were coded as 
envelopes in alleged violation of the law. The remaining cases were coded as oral, letter and 
service or contract agreements in alleged violation of the law.  
Table 26 
Advertising medium allegedly in violation during the all-Republican four-year term 
 
Advertising medium 
 
Frequency Percent 
Print 0 0% 
Oral 1 8% 
Envelope 2 17% 
Letter 1 8% 
Service/contract agreement 1 8% 
Outdoor 0 0% 
Telephone  0 0% 
Radio 1 8% 
Website 0 0% 
Multiple mediums 4 33% 
Multiple mediums including 
internet 2 17% 
Total 12 100% 
 
 
 Table 27 looks at all 56 cases and the frequency of mediums of all alleged deceptive 
advertising violations. Of all 56 cases, multiple medium advertising campaigns without the 
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internet were the most common advertising medium allegedly in violation of Wisconsin’s 
deceptive advertising law at 28.5%. 
Table 27 
Advertising medium allegedly in violation  
 
Advertising medium 
 
 
Frequency 
 
Percent 
Print 1 1.8% 
Oral 1 1.8% 
Envelope 5 8.9% 
Letter 2 3.6% 
Service/contract agreement 2 3.6% 
Outdoor 7 12.5% 
Telephone  13 23.2% 
Radio 1 1.8% 
Website 2 3.6% 
Multiple mediums 16 28.5% 
Multiple mediums including the 
internet 
6 10.7% 
Total 56 100% 
 
 The second most common advertising medium allegedly in violation was telephone calls 
at 23.2%. Forms of outdoor advertising accounted for 12.5% of the cases. Forms of alleged 
deceptive advertising via the internet got a late start. Deceptive internet advertising was unheard 
of in Wisconsin before 2007, but multiple medium advertising campaigns with an internet 
component accounted for 10.7% of all cases and when websites are added various forms of 
internet advertising account for 14.3% of all the cases allegedly in violation of Wisconsin’s 
deceptive advertising law. 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION             
 Chapter 4 laid out the findings of this study based on the methodology outlined in 
Chapter 3. Given the high number of consumer complaints the Department of Agriculture, 
Trade and Consumer Protection receives annually, I was surprised that only 79 cases of deceptive 
advertising were filed from 2003 through 2014, I had anticipated the number of deceptive 
advertising cases filed to be larger. The vast majority of consumer complaints are settled during 
by simply informing the consumer of their legal rights under the law. Another large chunk of the 
complaints are settled by simply sending a warning letter to the accused business.193 For this 
study, 56 (70.9%) deceptive advertising cases out of the 79 cases identified were analyzed and 
coded to identify characteristics of the cases as well as prosecutorial trends. This chapter aims to 
expand on those findings and what they mean.  
I.  Discussion of Hypotheses 
A.  Discussion of Hypothesis 1  
 This study suggests that when the governor and attorney general are both Democrats, 
alleged instances of deceptive advertising are more likely to be escalated to state prosecutions 
than under a mixed or all-Republican term. As described in Chapter 2, consumer complaints of 
deceptive advertising go through the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection and are investigated, then referred to the Department of Justice if prosecution is 
deemed necessary by the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection. The 
                                               
193 Ferguson and Onsager, supra note 91 at 13; Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 at 17. In 2010, a warning 
letter resolved 1,012 complaints. In 2011, a warning letter resolved 1,288 consumer complaints. In 2012, a warning 
letter resolved 1,511 complaints. In 2013, a warning letter resolved 1,216 consumer complaints. 
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Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection also has the power to settle with 
organizations thought to be violating the deceptive advertising law instead of formally 
prosecuting. The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection can order 
restitution to deceived consumers and issue civil forfeitures to cover fees and investigation 
costs.194 Settlements that are reached through either government agency do not imply that the 
alleged offending party is admitting that any Wisconsin laws or regulations were violated. 
Instances of deceptive advertising are not actively monitored by the government, but rather rely 
on consumers to file a complaint.195 With this procedure in place for handling deceptive 
advertising claims, the findings suggest that several things may have been happening from 2007 
through 2014.  
 One might speculate that the nearly 50% (42 cases filed from 2003 through 2006 in all 
Wisconsin counties to 23 cases filed from 2007 through 2010) decrease in deceptive advertising 
cases prosecuted by the Department of Justice means that there were fewer consumer complaints 
made from 2007 through 2010. But The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection, receives on average “15,000 complaints every year about possible wrongdoing, fraud, 
defective products and other deceptive business practices.”196 So if approximately the same 
number of complaints are coming in, presumably the average number of cases going to 
prosecution should remain relatively the same. Another speculation one might make considering 
                                               
194 Rick Barrett, Wyndham Vacation Ownership agrees to $665,000 settlement with consumers, JOURNAL SENTINEL, 
May 28, 2015, http://archive.jsonline.com/business/wyndham29-b99508960z1-305330681.html. The Wyndham 
settlement was done through the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection. There is no record 
of any prosecutorial proceedings for Wyndham in CCAP. 
195 Telephone Interview with Lara Sutherlin, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, supra 
note 172. 
196 Dan Cassuto, INVESTIGATION: STATE IGNORES SOME CONSUMER COMPLAINTS WKOW.COM (2010), 
http://www.wkow.com/story/11965435/investigation-state-ignores-some-consumer-complaints (last visited Sep 27, 
2016). 
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the average number of complaints didn’t decline is that the Department of Agriculture, Trade 
and Consumer Protection referred cases to the Department of Justice but the Attorney General 
declined to prosecute all the referrals. Finally, it is possible that while the average number of 
consumer complaints remained the same but the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection simply referred fewer cases to the Department of Justice for prosecution. 
 From 2011 through 2014, the Department of Justice prosecuted 14 deceptive advertising 
cases, far fewer cases than during the previous two four-year terms. But the number of consumer 
complaints was not decreasing. In fact, in 2014, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and 
Consumer Protection saw an increase in consumer complaints.197 The continued decrease in 
deceptive advertising cases prosecuted by the state of Wisconsin as more Republicans entered 
into office reinforces the notion that Republican politicians are more hands off regarding 
business autonomy and advertising regulation. 
 In 2009, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection was accused of 
outright ignoring consumer complaints by the WKOW news outlet.198 The governor at the time 
was Jim Doyle and J.B. Van Hollen (R) was the attorney general. WKOW investigative reporter 
Dan Cassuto alleged that the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection either 
“ignores, hands off or rushes to close complaints about serious consumer fraud, scams and 
wrongdoing.”199 Cassuto’s investigation found that complaints were often closed by “sending a 
form letter to the suspect” with little to no investigation taking place.200 Additionally, many 
                                               
197 Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, WI DATCP NEWS: CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 
ON THE RISE IN 2014 (2015), www.datcp.wi.gov/news/?Id=1231 (last visited Mar 15, 2015). 
198 Cassuto, supra note 196. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. 
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victims were notified of their complaint cases being closed months and sometimes years after the 
case was closed.201 I also came across another instance of allegedly deceptive advertising from 
2015 (out of the scope of this study), that was settled by the Department of Agriculture, Trade 
and Consumer Protection for over half a million dollars in restitution, fines, fees and 
assessments.202 Allegedly, the settlement was filed in Sauk County Court, but there is no court 
record of this alleged violation in CCAP.203 The WKOW investigative series by Cassuto, who 
accused the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection of failing to protect 
Wisconsin consumers, paired with the findings of this study suggests that failure to enforce state 
regulations is a continuing trend.  
 Despite the continued declining prosecution of deceptive advertising cases, the findings 
suggest that cases that are prosecuted by the Department of Justice are likely to reach an outcome 
in the State’s favor.  The Democratic governor and attorney genera are far more likely to 
prosecute alleged deceptive advertising violations, but both parties are careful to prosecute cases 
that will end in the prosecution’s favor. Of the 56 cases coded for only 5% of the cases ended in 
the defendant’s favor, these cases were dismissed. Of the 56 cases coded for, not a single case that 
went to trial ended in a not guilty verdict.  
 The substantial drop in the number of cases from the all-Democratic four-year term (42 
total, 27 included in the study) to the mixed four-year term (23 total, 17 included in the study) 
raises questions. Jim Doyle (D) was the governor during the first and second four-year terms. 
                                               
201 Id. 
202 Barrett, supra note 194. 
203 George Hesselberg, Wyndham timeshare outfit settles state consumer complaints for $665,000, WISCONSIN STATE 
JOURNAL, May 29, 2015, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/wyndham-timeshare-outfit-settles-state-
consumer-complaints-for/article_98521dde-43a4-5b8d-bf62-73dd6935f839.html (last visited Sep 27, 2014) There 
are two cases filed in Sauk county with Wyndham named as a garnishee, not as a defendant. 
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The change in party in 2007 was the attorney general; Republican J.B. Van Hollen replaced 
Peggy Lautenschlager (D). Because Doyle was governor for both term and the change in party 
affiliation was at the attorney general level, could suggest that Wisconsin’s Attorney General has 
more power over the prosecutions of allegedly deceptive advertising than the governor.  
  That shifts the focus back to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection and its secretary, appointed by the governor. From 2003-July of 2010, the 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection had the same secretary, Rod 
Nilsestuen, who had been appointed by Doyle. Nilsestuen was replaced with Randy Romanski in 
2010, because of Nilsestuen’s death in July of 2010.204 Romanski was also an appointee of Doyle. 
It isn’t unreasonable to believe that the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection continued to send cases to be reviewed and prosecuted by the Department of Justice 
while Doyle and his appointed secretary were still in office, but that the Republican headed 
Department of Justice declined to prosecute. However, Cassuto contends that the Consumer 
Protection Bureau has priorities and focuses nearly exclusively on  “Do Not Call list violations, 
landlord/tenant disputes and telecommunication problems.”205 If the consumer complaint doesn’t 
fit into one of these categories, “Consumer Protection says you can either sue on your own or 
hope that Attorney General Van Hollen takes the case.”206 In a 2010 interview with WKOW, 
Van Hollen stated that the Department of Justice’s “hands are somewhat tied by what Consumer 
Protection does,” but admitted that more cases could be investigated and prosecuted if the 
                                               
204 Devin Rose, Romanski is appointed to replace Nilsestuen as state DATCP secretary, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, 
August 30, 2010, http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/romanski-is-appointed-to-replace-
nilsestuen-as-state-datcp-secretary/article_00b73a26-b49d-11df-8548-001cc4c03286.html (last visited Jun 26, 
2010). 
205 Cassuto, supra note 196. 
206 Id. 
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Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection had more legislative funding and a 
larger staff.207 So are these two agencies and their consumer protection units really working 
together on behalf of Wisconsin consumers? 
 The findings in this study suggest that Cassuto’s investigation had no effect on the 
regulatory departments and that the routine dismissal of consumer complaints continued. 
Cassuto’s investigation turned up over 40 complaints about A Great American Balloon 
Company for failing to give balloon rides to Wisconsin consumers who purchased tickets.208 The 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection never investigated these consumer 
complaints. And when the Democratic governor changed from Doyle to the Republican 
governor, Scott Walker, and Republican attorney general, J.B. Van Hollen remained in office, 
the number of allegedly deceptive advertising cases took another plunge. The mixed term 
prosecuted 23 deceptive advertising cases in total, and the all-Republican term prosecuted 14 
allegedly deceptive advertising cases. Also, with the election of Walker, came the appointment to 
the secretary of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection, Ben Brancel. 
Brancel. Brancel had held the position previously under Republican Governor Tommy 
Thompson.209 Again, it is unknown how many alleged cases of deceptive advertising violations 
Brancel referred to Van Hollen’s office. But given the declining trends in the years previously, it 
would stand to reason that fewer instances of deceptive advertising violations were referred to 
                                               
207 Id. 
208 Id.; Bill Lueders, WKOW HIDES EXPOSE ON A GREAT AMERICAN BALLOON COMPANY ISTHMUS (2009), 
http://isthmus.com/news/news/wkow-hides-expose-on-a-great-american-balloon-company/. 
209 Lyn Jerde, Endeavor beef farmer Ben Brancel gets top state agriculture post, DAILY REGISTER, December 30, 2010, 
http://www.wiscnews.com/portagedailyregister/news/article_74fcd5a4-149b-11e0-887e-001cc4c002e0.html (last 
visited Jun 26, 2016). 
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Van Hollen’s office from 2011 through 2014 because the governor, attorney general and 
Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection secretary were Republican.  
B.  Discussion of Hypothesis 2  
 The findings of this study suggest that while Democrats are likely to prosecute more 
violations of Wisconsin’s deceptive advertising statute than Republicans, the fines associated 
with a deceptive advertising violation under a Democratic governor and attorney general are 
likely to be less than fines under a Republican governor and attorney general. This study looked 
at the median forfeitures issued per case rather than the average because each case was assigned 
an individual forfeiture rather than a standard issue forfeiture. Despite this, there is a rather 
sizeable increase of the total median forfeiture per case when Van Hollen was elected as attorney 
general alongside Doyle as governor. During the all-Democratic term, the total median forfeiture 
was just over $7,000. The total median forfeiture increased nearly 15 times the median total 
forfeiture from the all-Democratic term to the mixed term. The all-Republican term’s median 
total forfeiture was nearly three times the median forfeiture of the mixed term. A Republican 
governor and attorney general are likely to go after fewer deceptive advertising violations, but 
hand out much heftier forfeitures. 
 Perhaps the heftier forfeitures stem from the larger acts of deception taking place during 
the Walker/Van Hollen term. Or, perhaps the heftier forfeitures are used to cover up the fact 
that fewer cases are going to prosecution but still maintain an image of consumer protection 
effectiveness. In 2010, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection’s 
Consumer Protection Bureau claimed that it had recovered $4.5million in 2009 for consumers 
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and the state’s general fund.210 At this time, the Bureau also claimed that it was referring more 
cases for prosecution than it had in the past.211 If this statement by the Consumer Protection 
Bureau, under the direction of Democratic appointee Randy Romanski is true, it further supports 
the theory that the Attorney General’s office was declining to pursue prosecution on a great 
number of alleged deceptive business practices. Thus, rendering a need for higher forfeitures 
ordered by the Attorney General’s office as the number of deceptive advertising cases prosecuted 
goes down to maintain the appearance that the state is tough on deception and Wisconsin 
consumers are being protected. 
  Of the 12 coded complaints filed during the Walker/Van Hollen four-year term (2011 
through 2014) half the cases had a total forfeiture loss of over a quarter million dollars. The 
Waukesha County Grand Vacations Club Inc. case, 2012CX01212 also cross-referenced with the 
2010 Outagamie County Going Places Travel Corp. 2010CX01213 concluded during the Walker 
and Van Hollen four-year term of nearly 4 million dollars. Both Country Grand Vacations Club 
Inc. and Going Places Travel Corp. were operated by William Baily and Christy Spensberger but 
in different locations and under different company names. Baily and Spensberger swindled many 
Wisconsin residents out of thousands of dollars in their vacation time-share con.214 
                                               
210 Cassuto, supra note 196. 
211 Id. 
212 Waukesha County cases 20102CX01A-2012CX01C are cross-referenced with the Grand Vacations Club Inc. 
case. 
213 Outagamie County cases 2010CX01B-2010CX01I are cross-referenced with the Going Places Travel Corp. case. 
214 Wisconsin Department of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL J.B. VAN HOLLEN ANNOUNCES JUDGMENT 
AGAINST TRAVEL SERVICES, INC., WILLIAM BAILEY, CHRISTY SPENSBERGER AND OTHERS FOR THEIR 
DECEPTIVE MARKETING OF TRAVEL CLUB MEMBERSHIPS WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (2014), 
https://www.doj.state.wi.us/news-releases/attorney-general-jb-van-hollen-announces-judgment-against-travel-
services-inc-william (last visited May 4, 2016). 
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 Also during the Walker/Van Hollen term, the state began prosecuting Corinthian 
Colleges, a for-profit institution, for deceptive advertising practices. Though this case was 
concluded after December 31, 2014, the governor and attorney general are Republicans, 
Governor Scott Walker and Attorney General Brad Schimel. Corinthian Colleges was fined 
nearly $9.5 million for its deception of thousands of students who didn’t receive the education 
they thought they were paying for. Both the Baily and Spensberger case and the Corinthian 
Colleges cases got a fair amount of media coverage and help legitimize the consumer protection 
divisions in both the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection as well as 
Department of Justice. 
 Ultimately, H2 was a logical assentation especially given that H1 is supported, but H2 is 
not supported by the data. There are may possibilities as to why the prosecution of more cases of 
deceptive advertising doesn’t result in higher fines, but the data collected in this study isn’t 
sufficient enough to explain why as the number of cases prosecuted goes down, the amount of 
fines issued goes up. 
C.  Discussion of Hypotheses 3  
 In terms of the outcome of the case, the findings suggest that no matter the party 
affiliation of the governor and attorney general the outcome of the case is likely to be in some 
form of settlement. Settlements do not have a guilty verdict or plea attached to them. But 
settlements come with a monetary forfeiture, which is a win for the state. Not applying a guilty 
label to settlements can also be viewed as a pro-business move so much so, it seems somewhat 
surprising that the all-Republican term didn’t have a higher likelihood of closing a case via 
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settlement. But a settlement can be less time consuming and a cheaper alternative to trial 
proceedings.215 Furthermore, even if a monetary judgment is ordered doesn’t mean that the funds 
will be collected.216 
  Going to trial has a 100% guilty verdict outcome for all three terms, but according to 
Table 13.1, going to trial is more likely when there is a Democratic governor and a Republican 
attorney general.217 This conclusion is representative of the outcomes of cases based on the 
elected officials in office at the filing of the case. However, trial doesn’t appear to be a popular 
course of action during any of the four-year terms. Of the 52 cases coded for, only seven went to 
trial and were concluded by December 31, 2014. Additionally, dismissal of a case is extremely 
rare. Of the 56 cases coded for only three cases were dismissed entirely. Of the cases coded for, 
only 46% of the cases that went to prosecution ended in a guilty verdict or a win for the state and 
Wisconsin consumers. The high number of settlements for all three terms paired with the low 
number of cases dismissed and cases going to trial further suggests that both consumer 
protection departments are aiming to please Wisconsin consumers with restitution and monetary 
fines to organizations allegedly in violation of the law. This trend also suggests a tendency of 
both agencies to foster a business-friendly economy by not attaching criminal charges by going to 
trial or settling with a guilty plea. 
 
 
                                               
215 Cassuto, supra note 191. Additionally, many of the case files I looked at still had outstanding fines. 
216 Id. 
217 This figure is speaks only of the 52 cases analyzed for this study. Of those cases, all that proceeded to trial were 
found guilty of deceptive advertising under §100.18. 
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II. Discussion of Other Findings 
A.  Outcomes and the Prosecuting Assistant Attorney General 
 There seems to be little correlation between the outcome of a case and the prosecuting 
assistant attorney general. The majority of the AAGs close cases in a settlement. Though, of the 
eleven AAG’s included in this study, four (36%) do not have any guilty verdicts recorded. 
Additionally, only two AAG’s have a guilty verdict rate over 50% and neither of those attorneys 
works for the Department of Justice any longer. Both assistant attorney generals, John S. Green 
and Lara Sutherlin close approximately half of their cases with a guilty verdict.218 
 
B.  Counties of Circuit Court Filings 
 Of the 79 deceptive advertising cases identified, over half of the cases were filed in either 
Dane County or Milwaukee County. Initially, this seems foreseeable; these two counties are 
heavily populated, and both the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
and the Department of Justice are located in Dane County. But the location of the Department 
of Justice shouldn’t have any correlation with the counties in which deceptive advertising cases 
are filed because the same AAG’s prosecuting cases in all counties. In fact, the last time a 
deceptive advertising case was filed in a county with less than 100,000 total population was 
2011.219 The consolidation of cases filed in Dane and Milwaukee counties is more representative 
                                               
218 It is worth noting Lara Sutherlin has a cases still open and it appears to being heading to trial. 
219 United States Census Bureau, WISCONSIN-2010 CENSUS RESULTS TOTAL POPULATION BY COUNTY 
CENSUS.GOV, http://www.census.gov/2010census/news/img/cb11cn80_wi_totalpop_2010map.jpg. The 
Countryside Meats case in Portage County, 2011CX01. 
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of the fact that consumer protection continues to be underfunded and consumer protection 
divisions in the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection and the 
Department of Justice continue to shrink.220 
 From 2003 to 2013, the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer’s consumer 
protection division employed on average 66 individuals responsible for dealing consumer 
complaints and investigations among other things. Before December 2009, there were four 
regional consumer protection offices located in Eau Claire, Green Bay, Madison, and 
Wauwatosa.221 The consolidation of the consumer protection offices to Madison didn’t eliminate 
jobs. But, it could be argued that the consolidation of consumer protection offices to Madison 
decreased investigations in less populated counties across the state and therefore had a part in the 
significant decrease in the number of deceptive advertising cases prosecuted. In 2014, when the 
consumer protection staff was slashed in half, the only deceptive advertising cases filed were in 
Dane, Milwaukee, and Waukesha counties, the three largest counties in Wisconsin.222 
 
 
 
                                               
220 Telephone Interview with Lara Sutherlin, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, supra 
note 168; Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 135 at 8; Ferguson and Onsager, supra note 140 at 6. Sutherlin 
stated that the "DOJ used to have consumer protection offices all over the state" but the unit has "dwindled to the 
smallest unit in the DOJ." The number of DATCP consumer protection staff decreased from 63 staff members 
from 2012-13 to 33 staff members in 2014-2015. 
221 Pollek, supra note 91 at 5–7; Pollek and Onsager, supra note 91 at 5; Ferguson and Steinschneider, supra note 89 
at 8; Ferguson and Onsager, supra note 91 at 6; Christopher Pollek & Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 84 5 (2007); Paul Ferguson & Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION 
PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 87 7 (2011). 
222 United States Census Bureau, supra note 214. According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Milwaukee County has a 
population of 947,735; Dane and Waukesha counties each have a population of 300,000 to 500,000. 
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C.  Advertising Mediums Allegedly in Violation of Wisconsin Law 
 When discussing deceptive advertising, the medium in which the deceptive or fraudulent 
message is distributed should be examined. Thirty-nine percent of the cases that were coded for 
advertising mediums were coded as multiple mediums (with and without the internet). Pushing a 
message through various channels is typical of an advertising campaign. But, many of the cases 
coded were not reminiscent of a traditional advertising campaign. In fact, not a single case was 
linked to an advertising agency. 
 Another high-ranking medium overall was telephone. This finding is interesting because 
it legitimizes Cassuto’s 2010 claim that the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection has priorities, and one priority being telephone violations. It seems that not all forms 
of deception are considered equal to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection.  
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
I. Overview of Study  
 This study only looks at the prosecutorial pattern of one Midwest state, Wisconsin. 
However, the findings do have implications for other U.S. states as well. Wisconsin and the 
Midwest are known as part of the most representative region in the United States.223 While this 
study is far from complete, it does offer a useful prosecutorial pattern of political parties to 
legislatures and voters alike. Both Republicans and Democrats appear to be tough on deceptive 
advertising, but each in different and not consistent ways.  
 This study suggests that Democrats tend to execute the law in a more evenhanded 
manner. If the law is broken prosecution will take place but the forfeitures are not as financially 
devastating. However, it seems that Republicans may only be prosecuting cases that egregiously 
violate the law and slap multimillion-dollar forfeitures on the violators.224 Some may applaud the 
Republican governor and attorney general for dealing hefty financial blows to these predatory 
advertising practices. But in reality, it seems that the Republicans and picking and choosing only 
to prosecute the worst offenders while other offenders are be getting off with just a slap on the 
wrist without Circuit Court filings and a public record documenting their misdeeds. These 
findings suggest that elected Republicans in Wisconsin do not enforce regulatory laws equally, 
                                               
223 Kiersz, supra note 165. 
224 Cases that ended in a over a million dollar forfeitures under the Republican term include the 2010 Outagamie 
travel vacation case 2010CX01, 2010CX01A-F combined with the 2012 Waukesha case 2012CX01, 2012CX01A-
C both involving William Baily and Christy Spensberger, the forfeiture for these cases was approximately 4 million 
dollars. The 2012 Milwaukee case, Vivant 2012CX07 had a forfeiture of over 1.8 million dollars and the 2014 
Milwaukee case, Corinthian Colleges, Inc., 2014CX06 had a forfeiture of over 9.4 million dollars. 
  
 
97 
but will let violations pass un-prosecuted as long as they are smaller infractions and not larger 
violation capable of bringing the state a substantial monetary gain in forfeitures. 
 Uneven application of the law on deceptive advertising by different political parties can 
have major implications for Wisconsin consumers. Active enforcement of the law can lead to 
fewer instances law violations. While only a fraction of consumer complaints result in a formal 
prosecution by the state, the fact that the law was enforced to its fullest extent is significant for 
those who received closure to their complaints. Additionally, the formal prosecution of deceptive 
advertising cases can act as a deterrent for other businesses within Wisconsin. Other businesses 
tend to fall in line simply to avoid the risk of getting caught if laws are vigilantly enforced. 
“Research shows clearly that the chance of being caught is a vastly more effective deterrent than 
even draconian punishment.”225 
 Far more troubling than the apparent failure to enforce state regulations in an even 
handed manner is the apparent dismissal of consumer complaints. I am not convinced that 
Wisconsin consumer complaints are being diligently investigated across the state. A company 
charging $200 for services that were never rendered to numerous consumers and refusal to 
reimburse those consumers is a clear violation of the law.226 How many more complaints have 
gone uninvestigated? The sole purpose of the Consumer Protection Bureau is to field consumer 
complaints, investigate those complaints and move forward with prosecution when the law has 
been violated. The department is not being asked to monitor the economy or intervene when it 
                                               
225 U.S. Department of Justice, FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 
http://nij.gov/five-things/pages/deterrence.aspx. 
226 Lueders, supra note 203. The hot air balloon company charged $200 dollars a ticket and failed to ever honor 
those tickets. At least 40 Wisconsin consumers complained to the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection. It can be assumed that many of those individuals purchased more than one ticket. The claims were never 
investigated and the company is now out of business. 
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notices deception or fraud.227 Rather, the department is reactive and should react to consumer 
complaints. Wisconsin citizens are asking a tax dollar funded regulatory agency to step in and 
regulate specific instances of fraud or deception. Unfortunately, it seems that if caught, the 
majority of offenders will “have a slap on the wrist,” and certainly not face any criminal 
charges.228 
A.  Limitations and Opportunities for Future Research 
 Further research needs to be completed to fully understand the trend in the decline of 
deceptive advertising prosecution and a drastic increase in civil forfeitures. This study is limited 
because not all 79 cases were coded. Additionally, the research design of this study cannot answer 
every question about the process by which a consumer complaint is resolved. There are far too 
many moving parts. Further research should include another term including a Republican 
governor and a Democratic attorney general would be ideal, but is currently out of the realm of 
possibility. Additionally, I would have liked to not have any cases still open during this study to 
shape a clearer picture. Other limitations of this study are the lack of knowledge of the final 
restitution outcome. Because the total amount of restitution wasn’t always clear from the court 
documents, how much consumers got is relatively unknown. Also, more interviews with 
additional assistant attorneys general as well as past attorneys general would help to understand 
the political nature of the department and the standard for beginning prosecution.  
 Future research of the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
would likely complement this study. Interviews with investigators within the Department of 
                                               
227 Telephone Interview with Lara Sutherlin, Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, supra 
note 172. 
228 Cassuto, supra note 196. 
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Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection’s consumer protection office should be included in 
future research. Additionally, a public records request for complaints and investigations made by 
the Consumer Protection Bureau is necessary. Comparing the prosecutorial patterns of 
Wisconsin and Minnesota would also help shape the scope of this study further and hold a 
stronger message on a larger scale. 
 
B.  Recommendations 
 The Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection and the Department of 
Justice each have their own consumer protection departments. These departments are state 
funded and expected to work together in the best interest of the citizens of Wisconsin. From my 
vantage point, it doesn’t appear that this goal is being reached. Historically, the Wisconsin State 
Legislature has struggled with the amount of power it believes each agency should have 
concerning consume protection matters.229 The desire to have enforcement authority split 
between two agencies is political in nature and does not truly protect the consumer or honor the 
legislation. While cooperation between the two agencies can be “reasonably effective,” 
Wisconsin should transfer full investigative and enforcement authority with the attorney 
general’s office.230 
 Not only is the attorney general’s office more likely to enforce the statute and proceed 
with prosecution, placing consumer protection interests over business interests, responsibility to 
                                               
229 Jeffries, supra note 98 at 563. 
230 Lovett, supra note 103 at 735. 
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the consumers would be consolidated.231 There would be no question as to who dropped the ball 
on investigating consumer complaints and proceeding with charges. Currently, Wisconsin tax 
dollars are funding two separate consumer protection units, but the promotions of consumer 
protection interests do not appear to be a priority. Continuing to place consumer protection with 
an agency that is also concerned with business interests appears to be a conflict of interests. Why 
have a consumer protection office in the Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer 
Protection if the prosecution of violations is going to be transferred to another agency entirely? 
 
 
 
                                               
231 Id. at 735. 
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Appendix A. 
Table of all Wisconsin cases and defendants prosecuted under §100.18 from 2003-2014 
sorted by county then case number.  
 
Table 28 
Table of all Wisconsin cases and defendants prosecuted under §100.18 from 2003-2014 
County Case number Defendant name 
Brown 2003CV0241 Midwest Readers Service, Inc. 
Columbia 2009CX02 Morey, Joseph A. 
Crawford 2006CX01 Murphey Oil Corporation et al 
Dane 2003CV0274 LCR Telecommunications, LLC 
Dane 2003CV0275 Best Web USA, Inc. 
Dane 2003CV2662 Platinum Marketing Group, Inc. d/b/a The Awards 
Center and Mirror Lake Resort 
Dane 2003CV3203 Kuhn & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Madison Kirby Co. 
Dane 2004CV0639 Vacation Showroom, Inc. 
Dane 2005CX01 Coons, Michael L. 
Dane 2005CX06 Radical Persson Inc. et al 
Dane 2005CX07 Best Buy Company Inc. 
Dane 2005CX08 Danecki, Richard L. 
Dane 2006CV1334 Yellow Pages, Inc. 
Dane 2006CX22 Marathon Petroleum Co LLC et al 
Dane 2006CX23 Bulk Petroleum Corp et al 
Dane 2007CX21 Medlife Plus Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21A Kraft, Mike G. 
Dane 2007CX21B Manning, Thomas M. 
Dane 2007CX21C Katosic, George 
Dane 2007CX21D Full Access Medical LLC 
Dane 2007CX21E Kinsey, Karen D. 
Dane 2007CX21F The Journal of American Medicine & Health Care, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21G American Medical Enterprise Association, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX43 Kool View Co Inc. et al 
Dane 2007CX65 Asphalt Specialists LLC 
Dane 2007CX65A McDonald, Jace 
Dane 2007CX68 Bluehippo Funding LLC et al 
Dane 2007CX68A Bluehippo Capital, LLC 
Dane 2007CX68B Rensin, Joseph 
Dane 2008CX14 Bonnell, Peter J. 
Dane 2008CX14A Schurr, Linda 
Dane 2008CX14B Investors Union LLC 
Dane 2008CX14C Annuity Service Center 
Dane 2008CX02 Preferred Readers Service Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23 Southeastern Family Publishers Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23A Hedberg, Valerie H. 
Dane 2009CX23B McGrath, Edward J. 
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Dane 2009CX24 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX31 Relief Law Center 
Dane 2010CX33 Relief Law Center Inc. 
Dane 2010CX36 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX40 Burlin, Joshua 
Dane 2010CX40A Elharar, Shachar 
Dane 2010CX40B Madison Locksmith LLC 
Dane 2013CX11 Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC 
Dane 2013CX11A Hyslip, Jeffrey S. 
Dane 2013CX11B Searns, Jason 
Dane 2013CX11C Aleman, Jeffrey 
Dane 2013CX11D Macey, Thomas G. 
Dane 2013CX2 Mandatory Poster Agency Inc. et al 
Dane 2013CX2A Fata, Steven J. 
Dane 2014CX53 Lovrien, Laura 
Dane 2014CX53A Liberty Publishers Services Inc. 
Dane 2014CX53B Orbital Publishing Group Inc. 
Dane 2014CX55 T-Mobile USA Inc. 
Eau Claire 2005CX01 Omni Plus Marketing Service Inc. 
Fond du Lac 2013CX02A Stitt, Mark F. 
Fond du Lac 2013CX02B ES Technology LLC 
Kenosha 2003CV0671 Liberty Online Services, Inc., and National Online 
Services, Inc. 
Kenosha 2003CV1413 Soho Marketing LLC d/b/a The Award Center, Debt 
Services International and Direct Reservations Center 
Kenosha 2003CV1414 Next Level Marketing, Inc., d/b/a UCC Total Home 
Gurnee 
Kenosha 2011CX01 Zapencki, Edward M. 
Marathon 2004CV0379 Panas, Richard James and Leisure International, Inc. 
Marinette 2006CX02 Krist Oil Co. 
Marinette 2009CX04 Krist Oil Co. 
Milwaukee 2004CV0957 Z-Tel Communications, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2004CV4283 Sherard, Will J. d/b/a W. J. Sherard Realty Company 
Milwaukee 2004CV4678 Strategic Marketing Innovations and Solutions, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX03 M.A.R. & Associates, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX05 Dawson, J. Dale & Gudrun Dawson 
Milwaukee 2006CX08 Ebert, Timothy Michael et al 
Milwaukee 2009CX02 GE Milwaukee LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2010CX07 Credenciales USA LLC, Hugo I. Loyo 
Milwaukee 2012CX06 Pinnacle Security LLC 
Milwaukee 2012CX07 Vivint Inc. 
Milwaukee 2012CX09 Wallace, Nicholas S. 
Milwaukee 2014CX06 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2014CX07 Paulos, Kaleb 
Oneida 2003CV0273 Environmental Safety International, Inc., d/b/a 
Environmental Products, Inc. 
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Outagamie 2003CV1005 P & M Consulting, Inc. and Market II, Inc. d/b/a 
Bluegreen Vacations and Christmas Mountain Village 
Outagamie 2010CX01 Going Places Travel Corporation 
Outagamie 2010CX01B Ruiz, Perry T. 
Outagamie 2010CX01C Ruiz, Lisa Ann 
Outagamie 2010CX01D Castaways Vacations Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01E Phoenix Vacations, Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01F Miller, Adrian D. 
Outagamie 2010CX01G Bailey, William 
Outagamie 2010CX01H Spensberger, Christy 
Outagamie 2010CX01I Travel Services Inc. 
Ozaukee 2004CV0287 WebXites, L.P. 
Ozaukee 2003CV0275 Shock Electronics and Brian Fontaine 
Ozaukee 2005CX02 Wholesale Connection Company (WCC) 
Ozaukee 2009CX03 Munteoreanu, Gabriel et al 
Portage 2003CV0157  U.S. Connect, LLC 
Portage 2003CV0366  Talk Too Me, LLC d/b/a 00 Operator Services and d/b/a 
American Directory Services 
Portage 2011CX01 Countryside Meats 
Racine 2004CV0775 Drucilla Anna Jones 
Racine 2005CX04 First American Funding Co. (FAFC) 
Racine 2010CX01 Prestige Business Solutions, Inc. 
Rock 2004CV0432 American Travel and Management, LLC. Kevin B. 
Raines, Francine Bauer 
St. Croix 2009CX03 Rassbach, John P. 
Sheboygan 2007CX02  Sunshine Travel Escapes Inc. et al 
Sheboygan 2007CX02A Maher, Joseph P. 
Sheboygan 2007CX02B Gettys, Joseph 
Sheboygan 2007CX02C Go Broadcasting et al 
Sheboygan 2007CX02D Funtime Getaway Inc. 
Vilas 2006CX01 Holiday Stationstores, Inc. 
Walworth 2007CX02 A Lighter Than Air Affair et al 
Waukesha 2004CV1241 Trugreen Limited Partnership, d/b/a Truegreen 
Chemlawn 
Waukesha 2007CX04 TV Marketplace LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04A TV Product LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04B TV Market LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04C Your Store Online LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04D Reoch, Chris 
Waukesha 2007CX04E Reoch, Paul 
Waukesha 2012CX01 Grand Vacation Club Inc. 
Waukesha 2012CX01A Bailey, William 
Waukesha 2012CX01B Spensberger, Christy 
Waukesha 2012CX01C Travel Services Inc. 
Waukesha 2014CX04 Michaud, Brian 
Waukesha 2014CX04A Michaud, Andrea 
Winnebago 2003CV1200  VoiceNet, Inc. 
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Winnebago 2006CX02  Lang Oil Inc. 
Wood 2006CX01 J D S Systems, Inc. d/b/a/ et al  
Wood 2006CX01 Schierl, Inc. 
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Appendix B. 
Table of cases coded from select Wisconsin counties from 2003-2014. Cases are sorted 
by county and then by case number. 
 
Table 29 
All cases and defendants coded from select Wisconsin counties used in this study 
County Case number Defendant name 
Brown 2003CV0241 Midwest Readers Service, Inc. 
Crawford 2006CX01 Murphey Oil Corp. 
Dane 2003CV2662 Platinum Marketing Group Inc. 
Dane 2003CV274 LCR Telecommunications, LLC 
Dane 2003CV275 Best Web USA, Inc. 
Dane 2003CV3203 Kuhn and Association Inc. d/b/a Madison Kirby Co. 
Dane 2004CV0639 Vacation Showroom, Inc. 
Dane 2005CX01 Coons, Michael L. 
Dane 2005CX06 Radical Persson Inc. et al 
Dane 2005CX07 Best Buy Company Inc. 
Dane 2005CX08 Danecki, Richard L. 
Dane 2006CV1334 Yellow Pages Inc. et al 
Dane 2006CX22 Marathon Petroleum 
Dane 2006CX23 Bulk Petroleum 
Dane 2007CX21 Medlife Plus Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21A Kraft, Mike G. 
Dane 2007CX21B Manning, Thomas M. 
Dane 2007CX21C Katosic, George  
Dane 2007CX21D Full Access Medical LLC. 
Dane 2007CX21E Kinsey, Karen D. 
Dane 2007CX21F The Journal of American Medicine & Health Care, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21G American Medical Enterprise Association, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX43 Kool View Co Inc. et al 
Dane 2007CX65 Asphalt Specialists LLC 
Dane 2007CX65A McDonald, Jace  
Dane 2007CX68 Bluehippo Funding LLC et al 
Dane 2007CX68A Bluehippo Capital, LLC 
Dane 2007CX68B Rensin, Joseph 
Dane 2008CX02 Preferred Readers Service Inc. 
Dane 2008CX14 Bonnell, Peter J. 
Dane 2008CX14A Schurr, Linda 
Dane 2008CX14B Investors Union LLC 
Dane 2008CX14C Annuity Service Center 
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Dane 2009CX23 Southeastern Family Publishers Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23A Hedberg, Valerie H.  
Dane 2009CX23B McGrath, Edward J. 
Dane 2009CX24 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX31 Relief Law Center 
Dane 2010CX33 Relief Law Center Inc. 
Dane 2010CX36 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX40 Burlin, Joshua 
Dane 2010CX40A Elharar, Shachar  
Dane 2010CX40B Madison Locksmith LLC 
Dane 2013CX02 Mandatory Poster Agency 
Dane 2013CX02A Fata, Steven J. 
Dane 2013CX11 Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC. 
Dane 2013CX11A Hyslip, Jeffrey S. 
Dane 2013CX11B Searns, Jason  
Dane 2013CX11C Aleman, Jeffrey 
Dane 2013CX11D Macey, Thomas G. 
Dane 2014CX53 Lovrien, Laura  
Dane 2014CX53A Liberty Publishers Services Inc. 
Dane 2014CX53B Orbital Publishing Group Inc. 
Dane 2014CX55 T-Mobile USA Inc. 
Kenosha 2011CX01 Zapencki, Edward M. 
Marinette 2006CX02 Krist Oil Co. 
Milwaukee 2004CV0957 Z Tell Communications 
Milwaukee 2004CV4678 Strategic Marketing Innovations & Solutions, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX03 MAR & Associates Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX05 Dawson, J. Dale et al. 
Milwaukee 2006CX08 Ebert, Timothy Michael et al 
Milwaukee 2009CX02 GE Milwaukee LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2010CX07 Credenciales USA LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2012CX06 Pinnacle Security LLC 
Milwaukee 2012CX07 Vivint Inc. 
Milwaukee 2012CX09 Wallace, Nicholas S. 
Milwaukee 2014CX06 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2014CX07 Paulos, Kaleb  
Outagamie 2010CX01 Going Places Travel Corp 
Outagamie 2010CX01B Ruiz, Perry T.  
Outagamie 2010CX01C Ruiz, Lisa Ann  
Outagamie 2010CX01D Castaway Vacation Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01E Phoenix Vacations Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01F Miller, Adrian D.  
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Outagamie 2010CX01G Bailey, William  
Outagamie 2010CX01H Spensberger, Christy  
Outagamie 2010CX01I Travel Services Inc. 
Racine 2004CV0775 Jones, Drusilla A.  
Racine 2005CX04 First American Funding Co. LLC. 
Racine 2010CX01 Prestige Business Solutions, Inc. 
Vilas 2006CX01 Holiday Stationstores Inc. 
Waukesha 2004CV1241 Truegreen Limited Partnership 
Waukesha 2007CX04 TV Marketplace LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04A TV Product LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04B TV Market LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04C Your Store Online LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04D Reoch, Chris 
Waukesha 2007CX04E Reoch, Paul 
Waukesha 2012CX01 Grand Vacation Club Inc. 
Waukesha 2012CX01A Bailey, William  
Waukesha 2012CX01B Spensberger, Christy 
Waukesha 2012CX01C Travel Services Inc. 
Waukesha 2014CX04 Michaud, Brian 
Waukesha 2014CX04A Michaud, Andrea  
Winnebago 2003CV1200 VoiceNet, Inc. 
Winnebago 2006CX02 Lang Oil, Inc. 
Wood 2006CX01 Schierl, Inc. 
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Appendix C: 
Coding Sheet used for this study: 
COUNTY 5=Brown, 12=Crawford, 13=Dane,  
30=Kenosha, 38=Marinette, 40=Milwaukee, 44=Outagamie,  
51=Racine, 63=Vilas, 67=Waukesha, 70=Winnebago, 
71=Wood,.........................................................................................._____ 
 
CASENUMB  ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
D-NAME  ______________________________________________________ 
 
STATCITE Statute allegedly in violation: 0=Not filed 1=100.18(1), 2=100.18(8),  
3=100.18(9) 4=100.18(10)(b), 5=100.18 (11)(d),  
6=100.182(2), 7=100.20(6) 8= 
......................................................................................................._______ 
 
 
NUMBER  Number of charges against the defendant(s):_______________________ 
 
DEF-INFO 1=male, 2=female, 3=business, 4=nonprofit 
........................................................................................................._______ 
 
ADMIN 1=Democratic Gov. & Democratic AG, 2=Democratic Gov. & Rep. AG,  
3=Republican Gov. & Republican AG
 ...............................................______ 
 
AAG 1=Lara Sutherlin, 2=Phillip D. Ferris, 3=John S. Green, 
5=Nelle Rohlich, 6=Meredith M. Earley, 7=Joint, 8=James D. Jefferies, 
9=Cynthia Rae Hirsch, 10=Diane L. Milligan, 12=Jerry L. Hancock, 
13=Brenda Yaskal,14=Lewis W. Beilin, 15= David J. Gilles  
...........................................................................................................______ 
 
DEFATTY ___________________________________________________________ 
 
WITHDRAW  0=Attorney was not withdrawn 1=Attorney withdrew 99= No attorney 
 
DATE-FIL  __________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE-CL 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
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ADMIN-CL  1=Democratic Gov. & Democratic AG, 2=Democratic Gov. & Rep. AG,  
3=Republican Gov. & Republican AG, 4=Republican administration 
outside of the study 
............................................................................................................._____ 
  
 
PATH Original pathway of the complaint: 1=DATCP, 2=DFI, 3=DOJ, 
 4=BBB, 5=multiple pathways, 6=Unknown 
..........................................................................................................______ 
 
MED Advertising medium: 1=print, 2=oral, 3=envelope, 4=letter, 
5=service/contract agreement, 6=outdoor, 7=phone, 8=radio, 9=television, 
10=email, 11=website 12=social media, 13=multiple mediums, 
14=other............................................................................................______ 
 
 
CASETYPE 1=civil, 2=complex forfeiture, 
........................................................._______ 
 
 
OUTCOME 1=settlement prior to trial, 2=settlement during trial,  
8=case dismissed, 4=trial guilty, 11=Case still open 12=no trial 
guilty.............................................................................................________ 
 
FINES   Amount of fines..........................................................................________ 
 
REST Amount of restitution recovered_________________________________ 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
DATCP=  Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
DFI=         Department of Financial Institutions 
DOJ=        Department of Justice 
BBB=       Better Business Bureau  
 
   101 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
A. Scholarly research, news articles and websites 
 A Deep Dive Into Party Affiliation: Sharp Differences by Race, Gender,   
  Generation, Education. (2015, April 7).     
  http://www.people-press.org/2015/04/07/a-deep-dive-into-party-  
  affiliation/ 
 A history of consumer protection in Wisconsin, The Journal Times (1998),  
  http://journaltimes.com/news/a-history-of-consumer-protection-in- 
  wisconsin/article_3932d947-af4f-598c-b195-098603d435db.html. 
 
 Babbie, Earl, THE PRACTICE OF SOCIAL RESEARCH (12 ed. 2010). 
  
 Bardes, Barbara A., Mack C. Shelley, and Steffen W. Schmidt, AMERICAN  
  GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS TODAY: THE ESSENTIALS (17 ed.  
  2013). 
 
 Barrett, Rick Wyndham Vacation Ownership agrees to $665,000 settlement with  
  consumers, JOURNAL SENTINEL, May 28, 2015,     
  http://archive.jsonline.com/business/wyndham29-b99508960z1-  
  305330681.html. 
 
 Bergquist, Lee, DNR enforcement actions down under Scott Walker, JOURNAL  
  SENTINEL, March 27, 2015,           
  http://archive.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/dnr-enforcement-actions- 
  down-under-scott-walker-dnr-enforcement-actions-down-under-scott- 
  walker-b994-297806681.html      
   
 Brewer, Mark D., and Jeffrey M. Stonecash, POLARIZATION OF THE POLITICS  
  OF PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Oxford University Press (2015). 
 
 Cassuto, Dan INVESTIGATION: STATE IGNORES SOME CONSUMER COMPLAINTS 
  WKOW.COM (2010),        
  http://www.wkow.com/story/11965435/investigation-state-ignores-some- 
  consumer-complaints (last visited Sep 27, 2016) 
 
 Center For Inquiry. (2014, January 8). St. Jacob’s Oil.     
  http://www.centerforinquiry.net/blogs/entry/st._jacobs_oil/ 
 COMMUNICATION AND THE LAW: 2014 EDITION, (W. Wat Hopkins ed.,  
  2014).	  	  
   102 
 Cyrus H.K. Curtis. (n.d.). Retrieved from       
  http://advertisinghall.org/members/member_bio.php?memid=594 	   Dalton, Russel J. Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in   
  Advanced Industrial Democracies (6th ed. 2014). CQ Press.	  	  
 Deepening Divide Between Republicans and Democrats Over Business   
  Regulation. (Aug. 14, 2012).       
  http://www.pewresearch.org/daily-number/deepening-divide-between- 
  republicans-and-democrats-over-business-regulation/ 
 Democratic Party. (July 28, 2016).        
  https://www.britannica.com/topic/Democratic-Party 
 THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC PLATFORM DEMOCRATS,     
  https://www.democrats.org/party-platform. (Last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 	  
 Dispute Handling and Resolution. (2015).       
  http://www.bbb.org/wisconsin/programs-services/dispute-handling-and- 
  resolution/. 
Dozens of consumers getting money back from complaints tied to timeshare  
  sales, FOX6NOW.COM (2015), http://fox6now.com/2015/05/28/dozens- 
  of-consumers-getting-money-back-from-complaints-tied-to-timeshare- 
  sales/ (last visited Sep 20, 2016). 
 
 Dunning, Thad, Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural  
  Experiments, 61 POLIT. RES. Q. (2008). 
 
 Eagleton, Terry, LITERARY THEORY, The University of Minnesota Press,  (2nd  
  ed. 1996). 
 
 Edelstein, Jeffery S., Self-Regulation of Advertising: An Alternative to   
  Litigation and Government Action. J.L. & Tech., 43, 509, (2013). 
 Flanigan, William H., Nancy H., Zingale, Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, and Michael  
  W. Wagner, Political Behavior of the American Electorate, CQ Press (13th  
  ed. 2012). 	   Glauber, Bill, George Meyer remains in center of debates on     
  conservation in Wisconsin, Journal Sentinel, (Sept. 22, 2013),   
  http://archive.jsonline.com/news/wisconsin/george-meyer-remains-in- 
  center-of-debates-on-conservation-in-wisconsin-b99102808z1-  
  224813582.html 
   103 
 GOP REPUBLICAN PLATFORM 2016, https://www.gop.com/the-2016-  
  republican-party-platform/ (last visited Dec. 1, 2016). 	   Goren, Paul, Party Identification and Core Political Values. AMERICAN   
  JOURNAL OF POLI. SCI., 49, 881–896, (Oct. 2005). 	  	   Held, David, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY Stanford University Press, 
   (3rd ed. 2006).  
 
 Goretzke, Cullen, The Resurgence of Caveat Emptor: Puffery Undermines the Pro- 
  Consumer Trend in Wisconsin’s Misrepresentation Doctrine, 2003 WIS. REV.  
  (2003). 
 
 Hesselberg, George, State Agency: Consumer Complaints up 10 Percent in 2014; ID  
  Theft, Propane and Telecommunications Lead the Way, WISCONSIN   
  STATE JOURNAL, (Feb. 11, 2015),       
  http://host.madison.com/news/local/state-agency-consumer-complaints- 
  up-percent-in-id-theft-propane/article_d663918d-fabd-5538-b8ee- 
  302533b93a52.html. 
 Hesselberg, George, Wyndham timeshare outfit settles state consumer complaints for  
  $665,000, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, (May 29, 2015),   
  http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/wyndham-timeshare-outfit- 
  settles-state-consumer-complaints-for/article_98521dde-43a4-5b8d-bf62- 
  73dd6935f839.html 
 Hinkston, Mark R., Protecting Consumers in the Modern Age: Wisconsin’s Deceptive  
  Trade Practices Act, 81 WIS. LAWYER (2008). 
  http://www.wisbar.org/NewsPublications/WisconsinLawyer/Pages/ 
  Article.aspx?Volume=81&Issue=10&ArticleID=1596. 
 
 Hoofnagle, Chris, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW   
  AND POLICY, Cambridge University Press, (2015). 
 Jeffries, James D., Protection for Consumers Against Unfair and Deceptive Business  
  Practices in Wisconsin, 57 MARQ. REV. (1974).  
 
 Jerde, Lyn, Endeavor beef farmer Ben Brancel gets top state agriculture post, DAILY  
  REGISTER, December 30, 2010,       
  http:www.wiscnews.com/portagedailyregister/news/article_74fcd5a4- 
  149b-11e0-887e-001cc4c002e0.html. 
 
 Jude, John S., Miscellaneous, 59 MARQ. REV. (1976). 
 
   104 
 Kepner, Kathleen, State Regulation of Advertising, in THE WISCONSIN BLUE  
  BOOK (1956). 
 
 Kiersz, Andy, REVEALED: THE AL STATES IN AMERICA BUSINESS INSIDER  
  (2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-most-average-states-in- 
  america-2014-4?op=1. 
 
 Lentz, Timothy O., and Mirya Homan, AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, University  
  Press of Florida (2013). 
 
 Levi-Faur, David, Regulation & Regulatory Governance, Working Paper No. 1  
  JERUS. PAP. REGUL. GOV. 4 (2010). 
 
 Lovett, William A., State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation, TULANE LAW  
  REV. 724–757. 
 
  Lueders, Bill, WKOW HIDS EXPOSE ON A GREAT AMERICAN BALLOON  
  COMPANY ISTHMUS (2009), http://isthmus.com/news/news/wkow- 
  hides-expose-on-a-great-american-balloon-company/. 
 
 McLeod, Saul, EXPERIMENTAL METHOD SIMPLY PSYCHOLOGY.ORG,  
  http://www.simplypsychology.org/experimental-method.html. 
 
 Newport, Frank, On Economy, Republicans Trust Business; Dems Trust Gov’t,  
 Gallup (2009), http://www.gallup.com/poll/116599/Economy-
 Republicans-Trust-Business-Dems-Trust-Gov.aspx 
 
 Pitofsky, Robert, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of   
  Advertising, 90 HARV. LAW REV. (1977). 
 
 Plevan, Kenneth, and Miriam Sirokey, ADVERTISING COMPLIANCE   
  HANDBOOK  (2nd ed. 1988). 
 
  Pope, Daniel, THE MAKING OF MODERN ADVERTISING, Basic Books (1983). 
 
 Preston, Mark, THE MOST “REPRESENTATIVE” STATE: WISCONSIN CNN  
  (2006), http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/07/27/mg.thu/. 
  
 Provost, Colin, The Politics of Consumer Protection: Explaining State Attorney  
  General Participation in Multi-State Lawsuits, 59 POLIT. RES. Q. (2006). 
 
 Provost, Colin, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, and Consumer Protection  
  in the New Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS. (2003). 
 
   105 
 Rose, Devin, Romanski is appointed to replace Nilsestuen as state DATCP secretary,  
  WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL, August 30, 2010,     
  http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/govt-and-politics/romanski-is- 
  appointed-to-replace-nilsestuen-as-state-datcp-    
  secretary/article_00b73a26-b49d-11df-8548-001cc4c03286.html. 
 
 Sutherlin, Lara INTERVIEW WITH WISCONSIN ASSISTANT ATTORNEY   
  GENERAL (2015). 
 
U.S. Department of Justice, FIVE THINGS ABOUT DETERRENCE NATIONAL  
  INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, http://nij.gov/five-things/pages/deterrence.aspx. 
 
 Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade and Consumer Prot., FRAUDULENT    
  REPRESENTATIONS,  ADVERTISING AND SALES CLAIMS,   
  http://datcp.wis.gov/uploads/Consumer/ 
  pdf/FraudulentRepresentationsDetails.pdf.  
 
 WISCONSIN LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN  
  BLUE BOOK (1970). 
https://books.google.com/books?id=_ccqAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA448&lpg=
PA448&dq=Cooperative+consumer+protection+agreement+between+the+
Wisconsin+Department+of+Justice+and+the+WIsconsin+Department+of+
agriculture+1969&source=bl&ots=0q2EvWQuE&sig=FoAETsJ3luIVXL
9BQuWs6QrB6ps&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiL7dfJyrvJAhXLOz4K
HZgVB0Q6AEIKjAC#v=onepage&q=consumer%20protection&f=false.  
 
 
B. Wisconsin government documents 
 
 Consumer Protection Programs, Report 97-20, Wisconsin Legislative Audit Bureau  
  Audit Summary, (1997). 
 
 Consumer Protection Reductions (Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection), Joint  
  Committee on Finance Paper #144, Legislative Fiscal Bureau, (2009). 
 
 Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection. (Feb.  
  10, 2015). WI DATCP News: Consumer Complaints on the Rise in  
  2014. www.datcp.wi.gov/news/?Id=1231 (last visited March 5, 2015). 	   Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection. (n.d.). Advertising  
  and Sales Claims: Fraudulent Representations.     
  http://datcp.wi.gov/uploads/Consumer/pdf/FraudulentRepresentations 
  Details.pdf (last visited March 10, 2015). 	  
   106 
	   Director of State Records-Modified by Eau Claire County WI. (Nov. 19, 2013).  
  Civil Classification Codes. 
 Ferguson, Paul and Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION    
  PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 85, (2015). 
 
 Ferguson, Paul and Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION    
  PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 86, (2013). 
 
 Ferguson, Paul and Michael Steinschneider, CONSUMER PROTECTION   
  PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL PAPER 87, (2011). 
 
 Pollek, Christopher, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS INFORMATIONAL  
  PAPER 75, (2003). 
 
 Polleck, Christopher, and Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
  INFORMATIONAL PAPER 79, (2005). 
 
 Polleck, Christopher, and Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
  INFORMATIONAL PAPER 84, (2007). 
 
 Polleck, Christopher, and Paul Onsager, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAMS 
  INFORMATIONAL PAPER 85, (2009). 
 
 Transfer Consumer Protection Functions (Agriculture, Trade and Consumer   
  Protection), Joint Committee on Finance Paper #140, Legislative Fiscal  
  Bureau, (2005). 
 
 WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Attorney General J.B. Van Hollen  
  Announces Judgment Against Travel Services, Inc., William Bailey, Christy  
  Spensberger and Others for Their Deceptive Marketing of Travel Club   
  Memberships, (June 3, 2014), https://www.doj.state.wi.us/news-  
  releases/attorney-general-jb-van-hollen-announces-judgment-against- 
  travel-services-inc-william (last visited May 4, 2016). 
 
C. Court cases, filings and statutes 
         Automatic Merch. of Am. Inc., 437 64 Wis.2d 659 at 663. 
 15 U.S.C. §§41-58. 
	   ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 ½ (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1972). 
 CF. MURRARY SPACE SHOE CORP. V. FTC, 304 F. 2D 270 (2D CIR. 1962) 
   107 
 Tietsworth, 2004 WI 32, ¶ 39, 270 Wis. 2d. 146. 
          WIS. STAT. TIT. 100, 100.18 (2014). 
D. Legislative records 
 Laws of Wisconsin Chapter 510 (1913). 
 State of Wisonsin Senate Journal Ninetieth Regular Session, 907 (1992), 
  https:docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/1991/related/journals/senate/19920505.pdf. 
   
 WISCONSIN, WISCONSIN SESSION LAWS 1945 Chapter 399 (1945). 
 WIS. S.B. 701, (1969). 
 WISCONSIN SESSION LAWS, 1 (1969). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   108 
Appendix A. 
Table of all Wisconsin cases and defendants prosecuted under §100.18 from 2003-2014 
sorted by county then case number.  
 
Table 28 
Table of all Wisconsin cases and defendants prosecuted under §100.18 from 2003-2014 
County Case number Defendant name 
Brown 2003CV0241 Midwest Readers Service, Inc. 
Columbia 2009CX02 Morey, Joseph A. 
Crawford 2006CX01 Murphey Oil Corporation et al 
Dane 2003CV0274 LCR Telecommunications, LLC 
Dane 2003CV0275 Best Web USA, Inc. 
Dane 2003CV2662 Platinum Marketing Group, Inc. d/b/a The Awards 
Center and Mirror Lake Resort 
Dane 2003CV3203 Kuhn & Associates, Inc., d/b/a Madison Kirby Co. 
Dane 2004CV0639 Vacation Showroom, Inc. 
Dane 2005CX01 Coons, Michael L. 
Dane 2005CX06 Radical Persson Inc. et al 
Dane 2005CX07 Best Buy Company Inc. 
Dane 2005CX08 Danecki, Richard L. 
Dane 2006CV1334 Yellow Pages, Inc. 
Dane 2006CX22 Marathon Petroleum Co LLC et al 
Dane 2006CX23 Bulk Petroleum Corp et al 
Dane 2007CX21 Medlife Plus Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21A Kraft, Mike G. 
Dane 2007CX21B Manning, Thomas M. 
Dane 2007CX21C Katosic, George 
Dane 2007CX21D Full Access Medical LLC 
Dane 2007CX21E Kinsey, Karen D. 
Dane 2007CX21F The Journal of American Medicine & Health Care, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21G American Medical Enterprise Association, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX43 Kool View Co Inc. et al 
Dane 2007CX65 Asphalt Specialists LLC 
Dane 2007CX65A McDonald, Jace 
Dane 2007CX68 Bluehippo Funding LLC et al 
Dane 2007CX68A Bluehippo Capital, LLC 
Dane 2007CX68B Rensin, Joseph 
Dane 2008CX14 Bonnell, Peter J. 
Dane 2008CX14A Schurr, Linda 
Dane 2008CX14B Investors Union LLC 
Dane 2008CX14C Annuity Service Center 
Dane 2008CX02 Preferred Readers Service Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23 Southeastern Family Publishers Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23A Hedberg, Valerie H. 
Dane 2009CX23B McGrath, Edward J. 
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Dane 2009CX24 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX31 Relief Law Center 
Dane 2010CX33 Relief Law Center Inc. 
Dane 2010CX36 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX40 Burlin, Joshua 
Dane 2010CX40A Elharar, Shachar 
Dane 2010CX40B Madison Locksmith LLC 
Dane 2013CX11 Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC 
Dane 2013CX11A Hyslip, Jeffrey S. 
Dane 2013CX11B Searns, Jason 
Dane 2013CX11C Aleman, Jeffrey 
Dane 2013CX11D Macey, Thomas G. 
Dane 2013CX2 Mandatory Poster Agency Inc. et al 
Dane 2013CX2A Fata, Steven J. 
Dane 2014CX53 Lovrien, Laura 
Dane 2014CX53A Liberty Publishers Services Inc. 
Dane 2014CX53B Orbital Publishing Group Inc. 
Dane 2014CX55 T-Mobile USA Inc. 
Eau Claire 2005CX01 Omni Plus Marketing Service Inc. 
Fond du Lac 2013CX02A Stitt, Mark F. 
Fond du Lac 2013CX02B ES Technology LLC 
Kenosha 2003CV0671 Liberty Online Services, Inc., and National Online 
Services, Inc. 
Kenosha 2003CV1413 Soho Marketing LLC d/b/a The Award Center, Debt 
Services International and Direct Reservations Center 
Kenosha 2003CV1414 Next Level Marketing, Inc., d/b/a UCC Total Home 
Gurnee 
Kenosha 2011CX01 Zapencki, Edward M. 
Marathon 2004CV0379 Panas, Richard James and Leisure International, Inc. 
Marinette 2006CX02 Krist Oil Co. 
Marinette 2009CX04 Krist Oil Co. 
Milwaukee 2004CV0957 Z-Tel Communications, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2004CV4283 Sherard, Will J. d/b/a W. J. Sherard Realty Company 
Milwaukee 2004CV4678 Strategic Marketing Innovations and Solutions, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX03 M.A.R. & Associates, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX05 Dawson, J. Dale & Gudrun Dawson 
Milwaukee 2006CX08 Ebert, Timothy Michael et al 
Milwaukee 2009CX02 GE Milwaukee LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2010CX07 Credenciales USA LLC, Hugo I. Loyo 
Milwaukee 2012CX06 Pinnacle Security LLC 
Milwaukee 2012CX07 Vivint Inc. 
Milwaukee 2012CX09 Wallace, Nicholas S. 
Milwaukee 2014CX06 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2014CX07 Paulos, Kaleb 
Oneida 2003CV0273 Environmental Safety International, Inc., d/b/a 
Environmental Products, Inc. 
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Outagamie 2003CV1005 P & M Consulting, Inc. and Market II, Inc. d/b/a 
Bluegreen Vacations and Christmas Mountain Village 
Outagamie 2010CX01 Going Places Travel Corporation 
Outagamie 2010CX01B Ruiz, Perry T. 
Outagamie 2010CX01C Ruiz, Lisa Ann 
Outagamie 2010CX01D Castaways Vacations Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01E Phoenix Vacations, Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01F Miller, Adrian D. 
Outagamie 2010CX01G Bailey, William 
Outagamie 2010CX01H Spensberger, Christy 
Outagamie 2010CX01I Travel Services Inc. 
Ozaukee 2004CV0287 WebXites, L.P. 
Ozaukee 2003CV0275 Shock Electronics and Brian Fontaine 
Ozaukee 2005CX02 Wholesale Connection Company (WCC) 
Ozaukee 2009CX03 Munteoreanu, Gabriel et al 
Portage 2003CV0157  U.S. Connect, LLC 
Portage 2003CV0366  Talk Too Me, LLC d/b/a 00 Operator Services and d/b/a 
American Directory Services 
Portage 2011CX01 Countryside Meats 
Racine 2004CV0775 Drucilla Anna Jones 
Racine 2005CX04 First American Funding Co. (FAFC) 
Racine 2010CX01 Prestige Business Solutions, Inc. 
Rock 2004CV0432 American Travel and Management, LLC. Kevin B. 
Raines, Francine Bauer 
St. Croix 2009CX03 Rassbach, John P. 
Sheboygan 2007CX02  Sunshine Travel Escapes Inc. et al 
Sheboygan 2007CX02A Maher, Joseph P. 
Sheboygan 2007CX02B Gettys, Joseph 
Sheboygan 2007CX02C Go Broadcasting et al 
Sheboygan 2007CX02D Funtime Getaway Inc. 
Vilas 2006CX01 Holiday Stationstores, Inc. 
Walworth 2007CX02 A Lighter Than Air Affair et al 
Waukesha 2004CV1241 Trugreen Limited Partnership, d/b/a Truegreen 
Chemlawn 
Waukesha 2007CX04 TV Marketplace LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04A TV Product LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04B TV Market LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04C Your Store Online LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04D Reoch, Chris 
Waukesha 2007CX04E Reoch, Paul 
Waukesha 2012CX01 Grand Vacation Club Inc. 
Waukesha 2012CX01A Bailey, William 
Waukesha 2012CX01B Spensberger, Christy 
Waukesha 2012CX01C Travel Services Inc. 
Waukesha 2014CX04 Michaud, Brian 
Waukesha 2014CX04A Michaud, Andrea 
Winnebago 2003CV1200  VoiceNet, Inc. 
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Winnebago 2006CX02  Lang Oil Inc. 
Wood 2006CX01 J D S Systems, Inc. d/b/a/ et al  
Wood 2006CX01 Schierl, Inc. 
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Appendix B. 
Table of cases coded from select Wisconsin counties from 2003-2014. Cases are sorted 
by county and then by case number. 
 
Table 29 
All cases and defendants coded from select Wisconsin counties used in this study 
County Case number Defendant name 
Brown 2003CV0241 Midwest Readers Service, Inc. 
Crawford 2006CX01 Murphey Oil Corp. 
Dane 2003CV2662 Platinum Marketing Group Inc. 
Dane 2003CV274 LCR Telecommunications, LLC 
Dane 2003CV275 Best Web USA, Inc. 
Dane 2003CV3203 Kuhn and Association Inc. d/b/a Madison Kirby Co. 
Dane 2004CV0639 Vacation Showroom, Inc. 
Dane 2005CX01 Coons, Michael L. 
Dane 2005CX06 Radical Persson Inc. et al 
Dane 2005CX07 Best Buy Company Inc. 
Dane 2005CX08 Danecki, Richard L. 
Dane 2006CV1334 Yellow Pages Inc. et al 
Dane 2006CX22 Marathon Petroleum 
Dane 2006CX23 Bulk Petroleum 
Dane 2007CX21 Medlife Plus Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21A Kraft, Mike G. 
Dane 2007CX21B Manning, Thomas M. 
Dane 2007CX21C Katosic, George  
Dane 2007CX21D Full Access Medical LLC. 
Dane 2007CX21E Kinsey, Karen D. 
Dane 2007CX21F The Journal of American Medicine & Health Care, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX21G American Medical Enterprise Association, Inc. 
Dane 2007CX43 Kool View Co Inc. et al 
Dane 2007CX65 Asphalt Specialists LLC 
Dane 2007CX65A McDonald, Jace  
Dane 2007CX68 Bluehippo Funding LLC et al 
Dane 2007CX68A Bluehippo Capital, LLC 
Dane 2007CX68B Rensin, Joseph 
Dane 2008CX02 Preferred Readers Service Inc. 
Dane 2008CX14 Bonnell, Peter J. 
Dane 2008CX14A Schurr, Linda 
Dane 2008CX14B Investors Union LLC 
Dane 2008CX14C Annuity Service Center 
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Dane 2009CX23 Southeastern Family Publishers Inc. 
Dane 2009CX23A Hedberg, Valerie H.  
Dane 2009CX23B McGrath, Edward J. 
Dane 2009CX24 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX31 Relief Law Center 
Dane 2010CX33 Relief Law Center Inc. 
Dane 2010CX36 Federal Loan Modification Law Center LLP 
Dane 2010CX40 Burlin, Joshua 
Dane 2010CX40A Elharar, Shachar  
Dane 2010CX40B Madison Locksmith LLC 
Dane 2013CX02 Mandatory Poster Agency 
Dane 2013CX02A Fata, Steven J. 
Dane 2013CX11 Legal Helpers Debt Resolution LLC. 
Dane 2013CX11A Hyslip, Jeffrey S. 
Dane 2013CX11B Searns, Jason  
Dane 2013CX11C Aleman, Jeffrey 
Dane 2013CX11D Macey, Thomas G. 
Dane 2014CX53 Lovrien, Laura  
Dane 2014CX53A Liberty Publishers Services Inc. 
Dane 2014CX53B Orbital Publishing Group Inc. 
Dane 2014CX55 T-Mobile USA Inc. 
Kenosha 2011CX01 Zapencki, Edward M. 
Marinette 2006CX02 Krist Oil Co. 
Milwaukee 2004CV0957 Z Tell Communications 
Milwaukee 2004CV4678 Strategic Marketing Innovations & Solutions, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX03 MAR & Associates Inc. 
Milwaukee 2005CX05 Dawson, J. Dale et al. 
Milwaukee 2006CX08 Ebert, Timothy Michael et al 
Milwaukee 2009CX02 GE Milwaukee LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2010CX07 Credenciales USA LLC et al 
Milwaukee 2012CX06 Pinnacle Security LLC 
Milwaukee 2012CX07 Vivint Inc. 
Milwaukee 2012CX09 Wallace, Nicholas S. 
Milwaukee 2014CX06 Corinthian Colleges, Inc. 
Milwaukee 2014CX07 Paulos, Kaleb  
Outagamie 2010CX01 Going Places Travel Corp 
Outagamie 2010CX01B Ruiz, Perry T.  
Outagamie 2010CX01C Ruiz, Lisa Ann  
Outagamie 2010CX01D Castaway Vacation Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01E Phoenix Vacations Inc. 
Outagamie 2010CX01F Miller, Adrian D.  
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Outagamie 2010CX01G Bailey, William  
Outagamie 2010CX01H Spensberger, Christy  
Outagamie 2010CX01I Travel Services Inc. 
Racine 2004CV0775 Jones, Drusilla A.  
Racine 2005CX04 First American Funding Co. LLC. 
Racine 2010CX01 Prestige Business Solutions, Inc. 
Vilas 2006CX01 Holiday Stationstores Inc. 
Waukesha 2004CV1241 Truegreen Limited Partnership 
Waukesha 2007CX04 TV Marketplace LLC 
Waukesha 2007CX04A TV Product LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04B TV Market LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04C Your Store Online LLC. 
Waukesha 2007CX04D Reoch, Chris 
Waukesha 2007CX04E Reoch, Paul 
Waukesha 2012CX01 Grand Vacation Club Inc. 
Waukesha 2012CX01A Bailey, William  
Waukesha 2012CX01B Spensberger, Christy 
Waukesha 2012CX01C Travel Services Inc. 
Waukesha 2014CX04 Michaud, Brian 
Waukesha 2014CX04A Michaud, Andrea  
Winnebago 2003CV1200 VoiceNet, Inc. 
Winnebago 2006CX02 Lang Oil, Inc. 
Wood 2006CX01 Schierl, Inc. 
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Appendix C: 
Coding Sheet used for this study: 
COUNTY 5=Brown, 12=Crawford, 13=Dane,  
30=Kenosha, 38=Marinette, 40=Milwaukee, 44=Outagamie,  
51=Racine, 63=Vilas, 67=Waukesha, 70=Winnebago, 
71=Wood,.........................................................................................._____ 
 
CASENUMB  ______________________________________________________ 
 
 
D-NAME  ______________________________________________________ 
 
STATCITE Statute allegedly in violation: 0=Not filed 1=100.18(1), 2=100.18(8),  
3=100.18(9) 4=100.18(10)(b), 5=100.18 (11)(d),  
6=100.182(2), 7=100.20(6) 8= 
......................................................................................................._______ 
 
 
NUMBER  Number of charges against the defendant(s):_______________________ 
 
DEF-INFO 1=male, 2=female, 3=business, 4=nonprofit 
........................................................................................................._______ 
 
ADMIN 1=Democratic Gov. & Democratic AG, 2=Democratic Gov. & Rep. AG,  
3=Republican Gov. & Republican AG
 ...............................................______ 
 
AAG 1=Lara Sutherlin, 2=Phillip D. Ferris, 3=John S. Green, 
5=Nelle Rohlich, 6=Meredith M. Earley, 7=Joint, 8=James D. Jefferies, 
9=Cynthia Rae Hirsch, 10=Diane L. Milligan, 12=Jerry L. Hancock, 
13=Brenda Yaskal,14=Lewis W. Beilin, 15= David J. Gilles  
...........................................................................................................______ 
 
DEFATTY ___________________________________________________________ 
 
WITHDRAW  0=Attorney was not withdrawn 1=Attorney withdrew 99= No attorney 
 
DATE-FIL  __________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE-CL 
 ___________________________________________________________ 
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ADMIN-CL  1=Democratic Gov. & Democratic AG, 2=Democratic Gov. & Rep. AG,  
3=Republican Gov. & Republican AG, 4=Republican administration 
outside of the study 
............................................................................................................._____ 
  
 
PATH Original pathway of the complaint: 1=DATCP, 2=DFI, 3=DOJ, 
 4=BBB, 5=multiple pathways, 6=Unknown 
..........................................................................................................______ 
 
MED Advertising medium: 1=print, 2=oral, 3=envelope, 4=letter, 
5=service/contract agreement, 6=outdoor, 7=phone, 8=radio, 9=television, 
10=email, 11=website 12=social media, 13=multiple mediums, 
14=other............................................................................................______ 
 
 
CASETYPE 1=civil, 2=complex forfeiture, 
........................................................._______ 
 
 
OUTCOME 1=settlement prior to trial, 2=settlement during trial,  
8=case dismissed, 4=trial guilty, 11=Case still open 12=no trial 
guilty.............................................................................................________ 
 
FINES   Amount of fines..........................................................................________ 
 
REST Amount of restitution recovered_________________________________ 
Notes: 
 
 
 
 
DATCP=  Department of Agriculture, Trade and Consumer Protection 
DFI=         Department of Financial Institutions 
DOJ=        Department of Justice 
BBB=       Better Business Bureau  
 
